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This thesis examines the activities of Henry Shelton Sanford, a "Gilded 
Age" businessman and private diplomat in securing American recognition of 
the International Association of the Congo. This organization, created by 
King Leopold II of Belgium to gain a colony in Africa, was a significant 
stage in the European partition of Africa. 
This study traces Sanford's activities largely through his sizable 
collection of personal correspondence, but also through government 
documents, contemporary newspaper and magazine articles, and published 
compilations of letters and documents pertaining to this subject. 
Secondary sources used include other unpublished and published works 
centering on Henry Sanford, surveys of American diplomacy centered on the 
Gilded Age, works pertaining to the Congo Free State and its creation, 
and accounts of the Berlin Conference. 
The American recognition of the AIC was a significant step away from 
traditional American isolationism. The U.S. set an international 
precedent by becoming the first nation to recognize the AIC. 
Henry Sanford served as King Leopold's personal agent in lobbying the 
American government and private sectors for recognition of the AIC. 
Sanford was motivated by a combination of self interest and conviction of 
the American need to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. This 
extraordinary individual represents an extreme example of the power of 
private business interests on American foreign policy in the late 
nineteenth century. He directed his attention to specific interest 
groups, in particular advocates of the colonization of American blacks 
and advocates of American economic expansion. In addition, Sanford 
cultivated a confusion among both the public and the private sectors over 
the identity of Leopold's organization. Through a combination of 
persuasion and deception, Sanford secured American recognition of the AIC, 
and, as a result, included the United States in the tragic history of the 
Congo Free State. 
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Prologue 
Regard an 1884 map of black Africa and observe the few demarcation 
lines. However, look at a map of the continent in 1914 and the 
comparison is astounding. Between these years, Africa endured a 
startling transformation, about which scholarly debate still rages. 
Historians have termed the three decades preceding World War I as "the 
scramble for Africa," a period during which the powers of Europe 
partitioned Africa. By 1914, only Liberia and Ethiopia had escaped 
inhalation by some European nation. 
The first concrete act in this "scramble" was the Berlin West African 
Conference of 1884-1885. Significantly contributing to bringing about 
this conference was King Leopold II of Belgium and his quest for a 
personal colony. Leopold achieved his goal with the creation of the 
Independent State of the Congo (the Congo Free State) in 1885. 
Although the United States never claimed any territory in the region, 
it still played a major role in establishing King Leopold's hold over a 
large part of Central Africa. Almost exclusively due to the activities of 
one extraordinary individual, Henry Shelton Sanford, the U.S., by 
recognizing Leopold's organization, the International Association of the 
Congo (also known by its French acronym, AIC), significantly contributed 
to Leopold's achievement. 
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This thesis seeks to explain how the activities of Henry Sanford, an 
American businessman, general, and former diplomat, helped bring about 
American recognition of the AIC, and, as a corollary emphasis, to offer a 
new view of America's recognition of Leopold's organization in American 
diplomatic history between 1865-1890, a period in American history 
commonly referred to as the "Gilded Age". 
Henry Sanford's role in the event has two larger contexts: diplomacy 
during the Gilded Age, an American subject, and the events leading to the 
Berlin Vest African Conference, a European topic. Before examining 
Sanford's individual activities, it is necessary for those not intimately 
knowlegeable about either subject, to briefly illuminate first the 
European aspect: the coming about of the Berlin Vest African Conference, 
and then the American aspect: the place that American recognition of the 
AIC and subsequent participation in the Berlin Conference traditionally 
assumes in American diplomatic history. 
I. 
Through much of the twentieth century historians have examined the 
question of how and why the "scramble" occured.(l) In that process 
certain apparent facts have emerged. Before the 1870's, the European 
nations involved in West African trade—particularly Great Britain—had 
little interest in creating colonies in the region. (2) As long as trade 
remained free and undeterred by any power, there was little interest in 
furthering political influence in the region. 
However, certain factors stimulated a new, heightened interest in 
Africa in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. Increased 
commercial demands in Europe for Africa's rich natural resources, such as 
rubber, palm oil, and ivory, facilitated the growth of large commercial 
houses—particularly Dutch and British--at the mouth of the Congo. <3) 
Furthermore, medical discoveries such as quinine allowed Europeans to 
live and explore in Africa at much less risk. (4) 
These factors stimulated the exploration of Central Africa by such 
explorers as David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, Lieutenant V.L. 
Cameron, and Savorgnan de Brazza. As the historian Sybil Crowe 
emphasizes, "It was these activities which finally brought the Congo into 
the sphere of international interest(5) Foremost among these journeys 
in the Congo region was Henry Morton Stanley's 1874 assignment from the 
New York Herald. Stanley's letters and telegrams from deep within the 
"Dark Continent" excited statesmen and the general public alike. <6) 
Before Stanley's journey, Europeans had possessed only rudimentary 
knowledge of Central Africa beyond the mouth of the Congo on the Vest 
coast and Lake Tanganika in the east. In his historic journey between 
1874 and 1877, Stanley crossed Central Africa along the Congo River and 
in the process revealed a massive—in many parts navigable—river 
through which Europeans could now penetrate into Central Africa. This 
discovery potentially eliminated the need for African middlemen. A new 
world of trade had been opened. (7) Stanley wrote to the Daily Telegraph 
in 1877, "I feel convinced that the question of this mighty water-way 
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will become a political one in time I could prove to you the power 
possessing the Congo, despite the cataracts, would absorb in itself the 
trade of the whole enormous basin behind. The river is and will be the 
grand highway of commerce to West-Central Africa." (8) 
Such letters fed King Leopold of Belgium's rising enthusiasm for the 
prospect of a colony in the Congo region. (9) Leopold had spent twenty 
years studying the potential of colonization as a means to expand 
Belgium's power and his own personal influence. By 1876 he had realized 
that the Congo basin was a prime region in which to begin. As a 
consequence, in September of that year he invited to Belgium selected 
explorers, scientists, and representatives from interested nations. A 
result of this Geographical Conference of Brussels was the International 
African Association, which included an International Commission devoted 
to the exploration and acquisition of information about Central Africa. 
The seat of this organization was Brussels, and each participating nation 
had its own national committee that would participate in the work of the 
Association. In the ensuing year, most European nations, as well as the 
United States, created national committees in association with the 
International Association. <10) 
Most historians recognize Leopold's Association as a ploy to gain 
ascendency in Central Africa. <11) As will be discussed in much greater 
detail later, Leopold dominated the Association from its beginning and 
directed its development. When Stanley returned from the Congo in 1877 
Leopold immediately made overtures to enlist him in the name of his 
committee. When Stanley failed to attract British backing for further 
exploits, Leopold immediately commissioned Stanley as the agent of the 
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King's International African Association. Upon Stanley's enlistment, 
Leopold created tlie Comite des Etudes du Haut Congo, at first regarded as 
a branch of the Association. However, the committee's emphasis was 
blatantly commercial and is now seen by most historians as "merely a 
cloak for the political aims of the King." (12) Once Stanley embarked on 
his return to the Congo in 1879 Leopold clandestinely dissolved the 
Comite and maneuvered himself into position as sole director of Stanley's 
activities. The new "International Association of the Congo" became 
Leopold's personal vehicle for territorial acquisitions.(13) 
Stanley had a rival in the French explorer Savorgnan de Brazza. De 
Brazza, in effect sponsored by the French government--although in name an 
agent of the French national committee of the International African 
Association—had been in Africa at the same time as Stanley in 1875-
1877. He returned to the Congo region in 1879, eleven months after 
Stanley. Between 1879 and 1883 both de Brazza and Stanley journeyed 
along the Congo signing treaties with local tribal rulers and 
establishing conflicting territorial claims in the name of France and 
Leopold's Association. 
The Portuguese had traditional and shadowy claims south of the Congo 
and along and including the mouth of the Congo dating from fifteenth 
century explorations. But for various reasons—notably apathy--these 
claims had gone relatively uncontested until the mid-nineteenth century, 
when Portugal and England initiated a series of boundary disputes.<14> 
Britain, to protect her small but impor tant trade at the mouth of the 
river, began to pressure Portugal away from the Congo. At first Britain 
carried out this policy with the cooperation of France, which also had 
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some interest in the area. However, de Brazza's remarkably successful 
1879-1880 journey into the Congo increasingly alarmed the British and the 
Portuguese at what they considered the encroachment of French claims on 
what had been a "sort of no man's land." (15) 
One historian emphasizes this alarm as the immediate motive for the 
Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, signed by the two powers in 1884. England was 
well aware of France's tendency toward exclusiveness and high tariffs in 
the territories it controlled; Britain had a strong commercial influence 
over Portugal and thus felt better able to work under Portuguese rather 
than French control. (16) The treaty, recognizing the claims of Portuguese 
influence between the five degree, twelve minute and eight degree south 
latitude, was considered by the rest of the European powers as a "veiled 
British protectorate" over the Congo. (17) 
Thus, King Leopold's aspirations for colonial power, the recent 
explorations by Cameron, Stanley, and de Brazza, and, most directly, the 
Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1883, all played causal roles in the Berlin 
Conference. 
Another factor behind the scramble for Africa was Bismarck's Germany. 
Victorious in the Franco-Prussian War, Germany emerged as a surprising 
new force, hungry for power. With Germany's new face, Europe witnessed 
increased tension in the diplomatic arena. A strain in relations 
between Germany and Britain, the resulting Franco-German entente, and the 
stress in European relations due to England's presence in Egypt, also 
played causal roles in the Berlin Conference. (18) 
Although historians speculate over which was the most important 
factor in the movement toward the partition of Africa, few disagree about 
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the events in 1884 that facilitated the convergence of the interested 
nations in November of that year. As already noted, the British and 
Portuguese, each alarmed by the territorial activities of Stanley and de 
Brazza, signed the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty in February, 1884. France, 
already chaffing at England's occupation of Egypt, immediately refused to 
recognize the treaty. Germany did not declare its refusal until its 
conflict with England over Angra Pequena (a strip of land along the Vest 
African coast) and the subsequent Anglo-German rift, after which it too 
refused to recognize the treaty. German denial was followed by that of 
Holland, Leopold of the Belgians and the United States, all of which 
voiced denunciations. (19) 
Many historians cite Germany's refusal to recognize the treaty as the 
death knell of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. Vhen the deadline, June 26, 
passed, "Bismarck's hatchet had indeed carried the 'coup de mort1 to the 
treaty." (20) The Franco-German alliance against England formed because 
both feared what they perceived as England's expansionist tendencies. 
Sybil Crowe considers the Anglo-German quarrel as unfortunate because, 
ironically, they were the nations closest in colonial aims and most 
interested in international free trade. France, conversely, was guilty of 
territorial aims. The resulting Franco-German entente, according to 
Crowe, was the direct cause of the Berlin Vest African Conference. (21) 
During the Egyptian Conference of June 28-August 2, 1884, Germany and 
France solidified their entente, supported Egypt against England, and 
united the question of Egypt to that of Vest Africa. (22) Together, France 
and Germany persuaded Portugal to put the unresolved questions over Vest 
Africa—raised by the now defunct Anglo-Portuguese treaty—to an 
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international conference. (23) From November 15, 1684 to February 26, 
1885, the conference met in Berlin. 
The Conference had come about in large part due to European—and in 
particular German—belief in English imperialist aims. But from the 
beginning of the Conference, Germany and England realized that their 
goals for Africa were almost identical, particularly as opposed to the 
motives of France and Portugal. (24) Both England and Germany professed 
their desire for free trade in the Congo region and free navigation along 
the Congo and the Niger rivers. The Conference assumed an 
internationalist, philanthropic tone in its preamble, which stated that 
the Conference's purpose was "to assure to all nations the advantages of 
free navigation...to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which might 
in future arise ...and concerned, at the same time as to means of 
furthering the moral and material well being of the native 
populations." (25) 
But at the same time, the resulting General Act laid the foundation 
for the future colonial divisions. Germany and England realized the 
danger of France maintaining a large degree of control around the Congo. 
The French were notorious for high protective tariffs which would reduce 
potential profits. As a result Bismarck recognized Leopold's Association 
just before the opening of the Conference on November 9, and Britain 
recognized it soon after the Conference began. Thus, partly for fear of 
French tariffs, the British and Germans decided that Leopold's 
Association was the lesser of two potential evils. Since France had 
considerable claims throughout the Congo, the only way to nullify them 
was to recognize Leopold's holdings. (26) 
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By the end oi the Conference, in separate treaties from the General 
Act, all the powers recognized Leopold's International Association of the 
Congo as a sovereign state--from 1885 termed the "Independent State of 
the Congo" or the "Free State"—where trade and commerce would remain 
unimpeded, while Leopold would take care of its administration. Leopold 
cultivated the idea that the Congo Free State would be a region where, 
under his royal tutelage, the native populations would be "civilized." 
This appealed to the European philantrophic ideals and also their very 
real financial interests. They were free of the economic and political 
challenges of maintaining administration but still had open access to the 
region. (27) 
Within a year, however, the Free State was in the process of becoming 
merely an area for exploitation and rapid commercial profits for Leopold. 
By 1908, the abuses of the native populations had became so notorious 
that Leopold was forced to cede the Congo to autonomous authority under 
Belgium. (28) 
The remainder of the areas already claimed by the powers were 
established as "protectorates." These protectorates seemed to follow with 
the philanthropic nature of the Conference, defined as "the recognition of 
the right of...actual inhabitants to their own country, with no further 
assumption of territorial rights than is necessary to maintain the 
paramount authority and to discharge the duties of the protecting power." 
But, in effect, they merely established the areas under the control of the 
European powers. The European nations were free to use their 
protectorates as they chose. (29) 
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While in the immediate future the powers followed the general 
philosophy of the protectorate, the groundwork was laid for subsequent 
colonial usurpation. By 1914, the partition of Africa was completed. 
Due to a blend of European rivalries, territorial interests, capitalistic 
pursuits, diplomatic misunderstandings, and the underlying belief in the 
inferiority of the native African inhabitants, few Europeans questioned 
their nations' occupation of the African lands. 
II. 
The Berlin West Africa Conference is generally a European story and it 
was the Europeans who reaped the territorial benefits. However, deeply 
involved within this venture that resulted in the creation of the Congo 
Free State was one extraordinary American, Henry Shelton Sanford. 
Because of General Sanford's activities, the United States has a place in 
the history of King Leopold's state. 
Some historians regard the period of the "Gilded Age" as a time of 
"slumber" in terms of American foreign policy, when Americans looked 
inward and isolated themselves from world matters. Other historians note 
this period for its series of "outward thrusts" that foreshadowed the 
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United States' break away from its isolationist policies in the 1890's, 
and emergence as a world power. <30) 
Referred to by David Fletcher as "the awkward years," the first half 
of the 1880's were studded with a series of "outward thrusts," that 
represent the undercurrent of expansionism in America during the Gilded 
Age. Under James Garfield's Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, and then 
Chester Arthur's Secretary of State, Frederick Frelinghuysen, these years 
were marked by a series of expansionist moves such as the creation of a 
Nicaraguan Canal treaty and a system of Caribbean reciprocity treaties. 
Included with these movements away from isolationism was the American 
recognition of the International Association of the Congo and the 
subsequent participation in the Berlin Vest African Conference. <31) 
Vith the election of Grover Cleveland in 1884, the proponents of 
isolationism prevailed with a repudiation of these expansionist thrusts. 
In 1885 the United States became the only participating power in the 
Berlin Conference not to ratify the General Act. Thus, for these 
historians, the participation in the Berlin Conference and its repudiation 
is an example of America's move away from isolationism and, the waning, 
yet still dominant, anti-expansionist environment of the 1880's.<32) 
Vhile this argument is acceptable, historians have failed to regard 
America's recognition of the AIC in a separate light from the Berlin 
Conference. This thesis emphasizes that the United States' recognition of 
the AIC remained a true step away from American isolationism. 
Traditionally, historians look upon the recognition as a step toward 
American participation in the Berlin Conference, and emphasize the 
participation as the most important aspect of America's role in the Congo 
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episode. The American recognition of the AIC has not been sufficiently 
studied on its own accord. (33) 
This thesis isolates the American recognition of the AIC as the more 
important event in American diplomatic history, rather than the 
participation in the Berlin Conference. Looked upon as a separate 
episode, by recognizing the AIC, the United States made an important 
decision, that, supported by various important interest groups, 
represented a step away from American isolationism that was never 
checked by the anti-expansionists. 
The United States participated in the Berlin Conference almost as an 
afterthought , in response to an invitation accepted by fourteen European 
nations. The American minister to Germany, John A. Kasson, had to 
convince Secretary of State Frelinghuysen that no word of the Conference 
objectives related to political or territorial arrangements. Moreover, 
Kasson had to assure Frelinghuysen that no government was bound to 
adhere to the Conference resolutions. Only when convinced that 
participation would not be out of step with the United States policy of 
non-interference did Frelinghuysen acquiese and appoint Kasson as 
delegate to the conference. (34) Like the other nations, participation 
required merely the attendence of the minister to Germany. Once 
appointed, Kasson was confined to discussing economic and humanitarian 
interests, with strict instruction against participating in any hint of 
land acquisition. 
Unlike the American recognition of the AIC, few Americans were aware 
of the Conference or of the U.S. participation. It was neither a major 
foreign policy decision, nor did it involve numerous interest groups. It 
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was a decision made solely by the Secretary of State and required no 
legislative approval. John Tyler Morgan, the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations committee who played a major role in acquiring the 
American recognition of the AIC, did not even know of the American 
participation in the Conference until it was almost over. Morgan wrote 
Henry Sanford in 1885, "You will be surprised to know that I was wholly 
ignorant of the Berlin Conference until I was informed of it in the 
newspapers. No one has yet mentioned the matter to me and I only know 
of what our Govt, has been doing from a response to the Secretary of 
State to resolutions of enquiry from the House of Representatives." <35) 
Fallowing the close of the Conference, an uproar would erupt in many 
sectors of the country. While such newspapers as the New York Times had 
supported the American recognition of the AIC, they castigated the U.S. 
participation in the Conference. John Kasson would find himself writing 
articles justifying the American participation at the conference and 
entreating the government to ratify the treaty. However, as already 
noted, the U.S., under the administration of Grover Cleveland, refused to 
ratify the General Act and, in addition, condemned the fact that John 
Kasson had L-.igned the Act at the close of the Conference. (36) In terms 
of the Berlin Conference, the United States can make little claim on 
influencing its outcome, or its ultimate results. 
In sharp contrast, the United States was the first power to recognize 
the AIC, and thus took an initiative that greatly helped King Leopold's 
hope of creating a personal state become a reality. By recognizing 
Leopold's Association, the U.S. secured for Leopold a legitimacy that the 
other nations would observe. Its recognition of the AIC increased the 
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legality of the King's claims in the Congo region and facilitated a "chain 
reaction" by the other powers that Leopold needed to recognize his future 
"Free State." In effect, by the time of the Conference, the "Congo Free 
State" was well on its way to becoming a reality. As one historian has 
stated, "With American recognition, the Congo Free State was born." <.37) 
The U.S. recognition of the AIC was the result of the lobbying of 
various interest groups that called for the United States to take action 
in securing the neutrality of the Congo region and was supported by such 
newspapers as the New York Times and the Hew York Herald. In addition, 
the legislative branch, along with the executive branch, was deeply 
involved with the decision to recognize the AIC. 
While participation in the Berlin Conference was condemned by the 
recently elected isolationist president, Grover Cleveland, America's 
recognition of the AIC was enthusiastically reaffirmed in 1885 with its 
prompt recogntion of Leopold's newly named state, the "Independent State 
of the Congo." 
Thus, while participation in the Berlin Conference is viewed correctly 
by historians as an example of the burgeoning expansionist tendencies in 
the 1880's being checked with the election of Grover Cleveland in 1885, 
America's recognition of the AIC in 1884 and re-recognition of the Congo 
Free State in 1885 represents a true step away from the isolationist 
foreign policy of the Gilded Age. In addition, this move from 
isolationism represents a profound paradox. The very reasons for which 
the United States so gladly recognized the Congo Free State are the same 
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reasons for which it became the most cruel and tragic example of 
European colonialism—its independence from a European power. 
The United States happily reaffirmed its recognition of the King's new 
state in 1885 because Leopold, as the sovereign of the Congo Free State, 
was independent of a European state and its influences. It was precisely 
for this very reason that Leopold had free license to so brutally exploit 
the people and resources of the Congo region. Thus, the great irony in 
the American step away from isolationism, is that in doing so it created 
for itself a significant place in the history of the most cruel example 
of European imperialism. 
III. 
Historians, such as Walter LaFeber, look to this period as a time when 
there was a growing relationship between American business and 
government, particularly in the State Department. While Henry Shelton 
Sanford's activities as a businessman capable of influencing foreign 
policy have been examined, particularly by his biographer, Joseph A. Fry, 
the importance of his individual activities have not been sufficiently 
emphasized. (38) It was due to Henry Shelton Sanford's efforts as an 
agent to King Leopold II that the U.S. recognized what would become the 
Congo Free State. Henry Sanford is an extreme example of the 
enthusiastic speculator of the Gilded Age, a man with very strong 
opinions about American foreign policy, and with a personal stake in 
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gaining the American recognition of' the AIC. While unsuccessful in 
business, he was exceedingly effective in diplomacy as is witnessed in 
his "Washington Campaign" when he obtained American recognition of the 
future Congo Free State. 
The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate Henry Sanford's role in 
obtaining recognition of the AIC, emphasizing him as an extraordinary 
example of both the ardent economic expansionist of the 1880's and the 
strong relationship between private business interests and the American 
government in late nineteenth century America in influencing American 
foreign policy. 
In order to explain Sanford's activities, this thesis traces Sanford's 
development as an economic expansionist and his growing involvement with 
King Leopold II of Belgium. Through graduating stages, Sanford became 
involved with Leopold's plans. Sanford acted as an agent in helping 
Leopold acquire Henry Morton Stanley's aid in obtaining the territory for 
the King's future state. Once Stanley joined Leopold's organization, 
Leopold used the two Americans— Stanley to acquire the land and Sanford 
to acquire the international aceptance of his new state. (39) 
Sanford's most important involvement in the Congo episode came in 
1883 when Leopold sent him to the United States to lobby for recognition 
of the AIC. By 1884, Henry had achieved this goal by appealing to 
specific prevailing American interests. The two most influential 
interests were a concern for economic expansion and the colonization of 
America's black population. 
The correspondence between Henry Shelton Sanford and other key 
individuals who played a role in the eventual recognition of Leopold's 
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organization repeatedly referred to "overproduction," and "markets," when 
referring to Africa. The most active men in bringing about the American 
recognition of the AIC, including Secretary of State Frederick 
Frelinghuysen and Senator John Tyler Morgan, Chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, expressed deep belief in the need to open African 
markets to American manufactured goods. John Kasson, the American 
representative at the Berlin Vest African Conference, was an expansionist 
concerned with opening markets and with American prestige as a world 
power. Sanford harnessed the private sector through powerful allies in 
the business establishment. Using his friend Charles P. Daly. President 
of the American Geographical Society and a man with strong ties to the 
New York Chamber of Commerce, Sanford was able to gain the powerful 
organization as an ally. Sanford, in convincing the U.S. to recognize 
Leopold's association, appealed to this specific interest in which he 
shared. 
In addition, Sanford pandered to a lingering and, in the 1880's, 
strengthening movement for colonization of what some believed to be 
America's unwanted black population. In this aspect, Sanford's activities 
fit into the interpretation of George M. Fredrickson, who emphasizes the 
alarm in the 1880's over the increasing black population in the United 
States as a step in the rise of racism. The "inability to visualize an 
egalitarian biracial society"(40) and the resulting popularity of 
colonization as a solution is represented by both Senator John Tyler 
Morgan and John Latrobe, president of the American Colonization Society. 
These two ardent colonizationists greatly helped Sanford obtain American 
recognition of Leopold's Association. Those who believed in colonization 
used Liberia—which John Latrobe had played a large role in developing— 
as a precedent of a private organization creating a political power in a 
region of Africa. Latrobe and Morgan believed the Congo basin could 
become a repository for American blacks. The freed slaves, according to 
these colonizationists, had a "superior knowledge" from having been 
enslaved in America. By colonizing in Africa, according to these 
advocates, the American black population could be a vehicle to export 
America's shining system of government and at the same time help 
"civilize" Africa. 
Thus, in securing American recognition of the International 
Association of the Congo, Sanford appealed to both the private and public 
sectors in exclusive and overlapping ways. To the private sector, he 
illuminated the Congo region as a repository for American blacks and as 
a market for surplus manufactured goods. To the American government, he 
also underscored the Congo region an answer to American overproduction 
but, in addition, he emphasized that by recognizing the AIC, the U.S. 
would be helping to "civilize" Africa and stamp out the remnants of the 
slave trade, thus adding a philanthropic bent to the argument. 
His arguments successfully secured for King Leopold the recognition by 
one power of the future Congo Free State. In the process, Sanford, 
disgusted by American isolationism, and with great hopes for what 
Leopold's new state could offer him—whether a post in the new 
government or a private company to exploit the rich wealth of the Congo 
region—was willing to deceive his supporters. He cultivated the 
confusion between the international and philanthropic International 
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African Association of the Congo with the personally controlled 
International Association of the Congo and led those advocates of 
recognition to believe they were supporting an internationally controlled 
neutral organization rather than a private enterprise. Thus, through a 
combination of persuasion and deception, Henry Shelton Sanford 
manipulated the United States Government into asserting itself 
internationally with the recognition of the AIC. His success represented 
a personal diplomatic triumph, as a private citizen singly influencing 
national foreign policy, and a significant step away from American 
isolationism. 
Chapter I 
Henry Shelton Saniord: 
Private Businessman, Public Diplomat 
John Garraty, in The New Commonwealth, properly takes issue with those 
twentieth century historians who have, when writing of the period between 
1877 and 1900, adopted Mark Twain's interpretation of the national 
character as The Gilded Age. Ironically, however, Garraty's own 
description of Twain's character Colonel Sellers as "of the gilded cane, 
grandiose dreams, easygoing optimism, and flexible ethical standards" 
aptly describes the persona of Henry Shelton Sanford.(l) Moreover, 
Twain's search for a place where "there is no fever of speculation, no 
inflamed desire for sudden wealth," would not have ended when he laid 
eyes on General Sanford.<2) This "all pervading speculativeness" (3) 
comprised a large part of Sanford's character. Born rich, he strove to 
make himself richer. Upon losing much of his inheritance, he spent the 
rest of his life seeking to regain the fortune he had lost. 
His involvement in King Leopold's plans for the Congo region was due, 
at least in part, to this latter acquisitive aspect of his life and can be 
viewed as one more speculative venture. Rather than investing money, he 
invested himself, spending huge amounts of time and energy to help found 
Leopold's state, with the hopes of future benefits. 
This study is not a biography. Sanford's biographer, Joseph A. Fry, 
aptly details Sanford's sporadic successes and ultimate failures. But by 
examining certain aspects of Sanford's early life, one can witness the 
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evolution of an American businessman—prone no speculative ventures—into 
an ardent economic expansionist. 
While he was ambassador to Belgium, Sanford became acquainted with 
King Leopold II of the Belgians. King Leopold, bored with his little 
kingdom and in search of a colony, initiated its creation by organizing 
the International African Association, ostensibly for the purpose of 
studying Central Africa and opening it to "civilizing" forces. In 
actuality, he was taking the first step toward the creation of his own 
personal organization. Sanford became increasingly involved in Leopold's 
activities and in addition, as is witnessed in his reports to John 
Latrobe, President of both the American national committee of the 
International Association of the Congo and the American Colonization 
Society, began laying the foundations for his future arguments in 
obtaining recognition of the AIC. 
I 
Born of a prominent Hew England family in Woodbury, Connecticut in 
1823, Sanford grew up in a wealthy business-motivated atmosphere. His 
father, a successful nail manufacturer and land speculator, embued in 
young Sanford a drive, energy, and enthusiasm for business. His father's 
interest in land speculation seems to have played a role in Sanford's 
intoxication with investment opportunities in little-developed areas and 
helped facilitate Sanford's weakness for high risk, big-yield 
investments. <.4) Both tor pleasure and with an eye for business 
prospects, Sanford travelled extensively, particularly in Michigan and 
Wisconsin, where his father owned land. Financially secure after his 
father's death in 1841, Sanford used a portion of his inheritance to 
invest in western land and railroads. <5 > While Henry's family expected 
him to settle down in Connecticut and direct his energies into the nail 
business owned jointly with his uncle, Sanford had other ideas. <6) 
He had tried working in the family business but the business acumen 
and temperaments of uncle and nephew soon clashed. The contrast 
demonstrates a telling feature of Sanford's philosophy of business. While 
his uncle possessed a rational and prudent business sense, Henry depended 
more on impulse and instinct, operating less with reason than emotion. 
Henry tended to risk large, big-money orders that the company could not 
necessarily fill. He hazarded dealings with customers about whom he knew 
little. Uncle Shelton. on the other hind, insisted on careful research 
about each customer and on taking only orders that were well within the 
limits of the company's manufacturing capabilities. While Henry 
suggested altering the weight in the larger orders and giving preferred 
customers cheaper rates, his uncle dismissed these ideas as unscrupulous 
business practices. <7) 
By 1847 Sanford had decided to sell his share of the business to his 
uncle. (8) After the sale, Sanford's financial holdings were impressive. 
However, he was not content to live on his principal holdings. He was 
driven toward investment opportunities. 
After his first intoxicating trip to Europe in 1841 Sanford had become 
enamored of the European aristocratic world. Through his extensive 
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travel in Europe and Asia Minor in 1842-1843 and again in 1845, Sanfora 
increasingly, in the words of his friend Jules Levita, became "European by 
intellect, knowledge, artistic and socialistic taste." (9) Sanford learned 
German, French, Spanish, and Italian and his life became increasingly 
focused on Europe. After selling his share of the family company, 
Saniord sailed again for Europe. This time, he was introduced to the 
career that he would aspire to, lose, and continually attempt to regain, 
for the rest of his life—diplomacy. By capitalising on various 
influential contacts he made, Sanford was offered a position as Secretary 
of the American Legation in St. Petersburg and then as Acting Secretary 
of the Frankfurt Legation. As his contacts improved, so did his 
appointments. By 1849 he had decided on a diplomatic career. Through 
his favorable performances in Frankfurt and St Petersburg and with the 
help of such prestigious family contacts as Thurlow Weed, Sanford 
acquired the post of Secretary of the Paris Legation in 1849.(10) During 
this time he earned his doctor of laws from the University of Heidelburg. 
Sanford, while loudly proclaiming the virtues of republican simplicity, 
very much enjoyed his luxurious aristocratic lifestyle in Paris. His 
mother, admonishing Sanford for his flamboyant style, wrote, "You ridicule 
the idea of aristocracy and at the same time hope to reach the same 
point if possible." (11) As secretary to the American legation and later 
as Charge D'Affaires, Sanford lavished money on himself and on Americans 
visiting Paris. This was to become a regular tactic in bringing people 
to his side of the issues. He would in the future be accused of buying 
his comrades with lavish dinners and entertainment. 
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During this period b'aniord increasingly demonstrated certain traits 
that would determine many of his subsequent actions. There persisted, as 
seen in his early work in the family business, a developed degree of 
craftiness plus a driving, aggressive ambition. On the victory of the 
Democrats and Franklin Pierce, the American minister to France, William C. 
Rives believed it prudent to resign his post and urged Sanford to do the 
same. Sanford, however, recognizing the opportunity for higher 
employment in the absence of Rives, ignored his request and was rewarded 
the post. (.12) Thus, In 1853 Sanford was promoted to the rank of Charge 
d'Affaires and functioned as the American Minister to Paris for a year 
after the resignation of Rives. During that year the new Secretary of 
State Villiam Marcy suggested to Sanford and fellow diplomats that in 
accordance with republican ideals, the elaborate diplomatic finery 
traditionally worn by American diplomats when attending formal court 
functions be jettisoned for the sober black suit worn by most Americans 
during important occasions. Marcy left the decision up to the 
discretion of each minister, and Sanford felt reservations at appearing 
at the very ornate and elaborate court functions of Napoleon III in his 
simple attire. However, Sanford, displaying his usual obsequiousness when 
personal gain was in question, recognized the opportunity to gain 
popularity with the new Secretary. Thus he immediately adopted the sober 
dress and risked the raised eyebrows of the French Court. While Parisian 
journals noted that Sanford was "the most conspicuous figure at the court 
ball last evening," Sanford, according to his biographer, relished the 
notoriety, especially since he believed his strict compliance with the 
State department's suggestion would help him in future appointments. (13) 
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However, on the arrival of the new American minister, John Mason, 
Sanford was disappointed to learn that a new secretary would be 
appointed. Simultaneously, Mason informed Sanford that he deemed it 
improper to discard the formal diplomatic attire. Sanford, personally 
offended and recognizing the opportunity to leave on his own accord 
rather than to be dismissed, sent his letter of resignation to the State 
Department. He correctly believed such a resignation would set him up 
"well before the country at home."(14) Mason recognized the scheme, 
stating that Sanford's actions were hypocritical considering the fact 
that he was about to be dismissed anyway. Sanford was accurate however 
in recognizing that his resignation would be more beneficial to his 
future than would a formal dismissal. American newspapers lauded his 
action.(15) 
On returning to the United States Sanford developed certain views on 
American foreign policy and furthermore displayed those traits that would 
directly relate to his involvement in the Congo. (16) His uncle, Philo 
Shelton, (whom his mother had unfavorably compared to Henry, believing 
that both shared a dangerous lack of caution and prudence in business 
matters) (17) had become involved in guano—a rich fertilizer speculation 
on islands off Venezuela. When other investors were granted permission, 
by the Venezuelan dictator to extract guano, they encroached on Shelton's 
claims on the island of Aves.(18) Shelton, convinced that Aves was a 
"derilict," island, enlisted his nephew Henry to prosecute his huge damage 
claim and prove his claim of ownership. (19) Sanford ably presented the 
appropriate evidence to the Secretary of State and simultaneously mounted 
a public campaign in support of his uncle's claim. 
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In a revealing exchange between uncle and nephew, Shelton inquired of 
Henry as to whether "the administration could be screwed up to the point 
of enforcing such a claim if some of their friends were let in as 
shareholders(20 > Equally telling are Sanford's frustrated remarks in 
response to the State Department's careful treatment of the situation. In 
terms of Venezuela, according to Sanford, the State Department's prudence 
was a "most rascally virtue" with "timidity worse than stupidity." (21) 
Clearly, careful study of facts before making important decisions and 
precise and thoughtful attention to detail were not impressive traits to 
Sanford. Moreover, with these remarks, Sanford demonstrated a view of 
underdeveloped areas that would become even more apparent with his 
actions in the Congo. Sanford regarded undeveloped regions as justifiable 
targets of exploitation by American business interests. He furthermore 
believed that annexation of Latin American territory was necessary for 
American commercial activity if the U.S. wanted to be competitive with 
Europe. Referring to the Venezuelans as "pigmies,"[sic] Sanford advised 
the new Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, to demand of the Venezualan 
government the payment of an indemnity. If Venezuela refused, Sanford 
advised, than the U.S. should resort to force. (22) 
Sanford's efforts resulted in increased pressure by the United States 
government on Venezuela. (23) Cass sent the note called for by Sanford, 
demanding that Venezuela pay an indemnity and threatening to break 
diplomatic relations if Venezuela did not comply within thirty days. (24) 
Eventually, after ten years of dogged pressure on the U.S. State 
Department and on successive Venezuelan regimes, Sanford collected 
$162,487.00. (25) More significantly however, the Venezuelan case 
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facilitated the creation of a new doctine of American foreign policy 
applied to Latin America: "Sovereignty of the United States over Derelict 
Islands," largely based on Sanford's arguments. <26) Sanford's efforts 
transformed a personal conflict into an American foreign policy issue. 
One American businessman, in quest of personal financial gain, had been 
able to incorporate the U.S. State Department into a minor, private 
skirmish to such an extent that the New York Times noted the possibility 
of a "speck of war on the horizon, Venezuela-wards," (27) 
II. 
The Venezuela incident, coupled with the fact that Sanford's actions 
resulted in a new foreign policy doctrine, demonstrated the increasing 
power of private business interests in American foreign policy. One 
historian cites the post-Civil War era as a time of simultaneous economic 
strength and upheaval. The perceived surplus of manufactured goods led 
many Americans to focus "on finding overseas markets for the U.S. glut of 
goods. Business needed an efficient global foreign policy to match 
industry's efficient global sales network." (28) 
Sanford is an extreme example of a growing number of Americans who 
believed that business needed, as one manufacturer stated at the time, "an 
intelligent and spirited foreign policy," willing to ensure a sufficient 
number of overseas markets for America's surplus goods. <29) Convinced of 
American superiority and destiny as a world power, Sanford devoted 
considerable time cmd energy toward convincing the U.S. government of its 
right and duty to assert its power over lesser nations. Described, as a 
"legal tilibusterer," Sanford in the 1850's and 1860's joined the ranks of 
those Americans demanding greater attention toward the assertion 01 
American power in behalf of business interests. (30) Like others, Saniord 
advocated the annexation of Latin American territory to guarantee freedom 
of commerce. 
Saniord would later redirect the-5 attitudes toward the Congo, 
seeking to exploit the natural wealth of the Congo region as others had 
done in Latin America. He would attempt to capitalize on the efforts of 
the English and French explorers in Africa just as others had capitalized 
on the efforts of the Spanish explorers in Latin America, both having 
entered into lands rich with resources prime for exploitation. Just as 
the British earlier in the century had successfully exploited the 
untouched coffee potential in Costa Rica, Sanford would attempt the same 
feat with ivory in the Congo during his Sanford Exploring Expedition in 
the 1880's. (31) While other opportunists had gotten to Latin America 
first, Sanford determined to be first in Africa. 
Another of Sanford's activities in Latin America also provided valuable 
background for his developing ideas about American foreign involvement. 
In addition to his struggle with Venezuela, between 1857 and 1860 Sanford 
worked as a special agent for two railroad companies seeking financial 
advantages from Latin American nations. In both cases his attempted 
missions proved unsuccessful, due in large part to the opposition of 
Latin American governments. As special agent for the Panama Railroad 
company, he was sent to Bogata, Colombia where he attempted to extend the 
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company's monotoiy rrcm torty-nine to :.ir.tv-nir.e years. The idea was 
met with vast opposition in Colombia, arid in April, 1860, the Colombian 
Senate forbade a new agreement. (32 "> Sanford returned to the U.S. empty 
handed, most likely reflecting on the power of the U.S. government to 
force an agreement for the private railroad company, had it so chosen, 
and on the necessity of American annexation of Latin American and other 
territory to guarantee successful commercial activity in underdeveloped 
areas. 
III. 
With Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860, Sanford was finally able to 
regain a diplomatic post, perhaps the most important of his career. 
Sanford had repeatedly attempted to attain a post in Latin America in the 
1850's. Having developed the reputation as a "Latin American trouble 
shooter" among much of the commercial community, (33) his appointment was 
strongly endorsed by influential businessmen and companies, many with 
huge investments in Latin America. Unfortunately, due to his ties to the 
Whig party, Democratic administrations had been wary and had declined to 
offer him a position. Sanford held few partisan political views and most 
likely would have fit quite comfortably into the Democratic 
administrations. However, his familial Whig background coupled with 
strong ties to such famous Whigs as Thurlow Weed decidedly diminished 
anv Democratic administration's proclivity to appoint him to the desired 
diplomatic posts. ( 3 4 )  With, the demise oi the Whig party and the rise or 
the Republican party, however, his prospects improved. Sanford, with his 
friends Thurlow Weed and William Seward, became closely allied with the 
more conservative wing of the Republican Party and, not s'jrtrisin^lv, was 
among those who endorsei a compromise wi'.b the South on the question oi 
slavey. Like many others of his political persuasion, Sanford travelled 
to Springfield, Illinois in hopes of convincing Lincoln to issue a public 
statement that would soothe the nerves of those southerners who feared 
the loss of their rights on Lincoln's innauguration. Although 
unsuccessful, he did become well acquainted with Lincoln and moved to 
Washington to lobby for the Panama Railroad Company and for a diplomatic 
post for himself. (35) With Lincoln's election, Sanford achieved his 
personal goal and was appointed United States Minister to Belgium. (36.) 
Sizing up Belgium as "afraid to do anything without the approval of the 
great powers," (37; Sanford's time was freed to pursue activities around 
the continent and in England for the war effort. Sanford's biographer, 
referring to these activities, entitles Sanford's role during the war as 
"Seward's Minister to Europe." (38) Sanford was given the responsibility 
of fiscal agent for the Union and in this capacity bought arras, 
munitions, blankets, cloth, and saltpeter for the North. (39) Some of his 
activities were controversial, and his critics enjoyed denouncing Sanford 
as a profiteer. Although such charges were never substantiated, Sanford's 
diplomatic career would be tainted from this period and severely 
curtailed. (40) Sanford's most interesting wartime activities centered 
around the espionage ring he developed for the purpose of finding and 
foiling the work of Confederate agents in Europe. (41) In 1861 Sanford 
employed a oand of detectives and directed his secret network with an 
eve toward England. Reasoning that the South would focus on England 
for vital supplies, Sanford successfully maneuvered a series of operations 
that sabotaged Confederate attempts to gain English support. Joseph A. 
Fry emphasizes the significance of these surveillence and sabotage 
activities to the Union victory and attributes to Sanford the creation of 
"the prototype" and the "tone for the entire Northern espionage effort" as 
well as deeming him more "responsible... [than] any other United States 
official for the form of the surveillance activities." (42) It also 
demonstrates his affinity for secrecy and intrigue, a trait that he would 
employ during the Congo episode. 
As in his experiences with his uncle in the family business, 
Sanford's propensity for undertaking unscrupulous means for the desired 
end propelled him further than the Union wished to go. Frustrated by the 
acquisition of ships and supplies on the part of the Confederacy, Saniord 
advocated the jettison of international law and the sabotage of the 
purchased ships. He begged Seward to intercept Southern ships and to 
seize those carrying contraband, and he emphatically advocated other 
actions that could have propelled England into retaliatory action against 
the Union. Sanford's statement that we can "discuss the matter with the 
English afterwards"(4 3) confirms his tendency toward drastic and 
irrational measures that harmed his careers as both a diplomat and a 
businessman. 
Simultaneously with his work for the union, Sanford energetically 
performed his duties as Minister to Belgium, in the process becoming well 
acquainted with the royal family. It is telling that while Sanford 
energetically pur^uea activities tor the Union cause, Leopold 1 viewed 
the Northern cause as "rank republicanism" and fervently hoped for the 
republic to remain split so that it would be reduced as a commercial 
rival. (.44; Neither father nor son, the Duke of Brabant, had any sympathy 
for the rule of the many. However, this does not. seem to have caused any 
moral problems for the ardent republicanism of Henry Sanford. 
Sanford had success as Minister to Belgium and became a court favorite. 
While minister, he purchased the elegant Chateau Gingelom, located near 
Brussels and the King. Sanford and his family would reside there until 
just before his death m 1S9'1 when, with mounting debts, he was forced to 
relinquish the grand home. From the 1860's onward, Sanford maintained a 
close relationship with the King. (45; 
IV. 
When, in 1865, the Duke of Brabant became Leopold II, few realized the 
colonial ambitions of the new monarch. Leopold, as one historian says, 
"had too little to do," and felt very limited as a constitutional monarch 
in his little kingdom of Belgium. (46) He had long been interested in 
Belgium's commercial expansion and the search for new markets abroad, as 
demonstrated by his return from a trip to Greece with a marble slab 
inscribed with the words, 'Belgium must have colonies.'(47) Leopold had 
earlier been interested in Africa as a prospective spot for future Belgian 
colonies but by 1860 his attention had been diverted toward the Far 
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East. < 4iJ) It was not until 1875, filter failed attempts to establish 
colonies in tiie East, taat Leopold's atteiit ion, sparked by reports of 
success from the European explorers in Africa, was redirected toward the 
"dark continent." He wrote, "I intend to make discreet inquiries as to 
whether there is not something to be done in Africa." (.49.» His inquiries 
led him to focus on Central Africa, where the explorations of David 
Livingstone, Verney Lovett Cameron, and Henry Morton Stanley had unveiled 
an area of great commercial potential. (50) Emerging from the jungle in 
November 1675, Cameron correctly reported that the Lualaba River, running 
from Central Africa to the Indian Ocean was the same as the Congo River, 
running from Central Africa to the Atlantic. (51; Unfortunately for 
Cameron he had not travelled the entire course of the river and thus 
couldn't prove his theory. More important for Leopold were Cameron's 
reports sent back to Europe, and read by Leopold in January, 1876, 
ecstatically describing the fertile land, rich with mineral resources, 
that the river traversed. (52) Leopold's proposals for colonies were met 
with skepticism by the Belgian citizens and thus Leopold, alone, assumed 
responsibility for colonization in Africa. <-53) 
Sanford had lost his post as U.S. minister to Belgium, in the 
meantime, with the election of President Grant in 1868. Although Grant 
nominated Sanford as ambassador to Spain, his nomination was quashed by 
detractors in the Senate who questioned Sanford's controversial actions 
during the Civil War and his subsequent activities. (54) Sanford was 
unable to acquire another diplomatic post and had engaged in widespread 
commercial investments around the U.S., particularly in Florida with its 
budding citrus industry. As long as Sanford had followed the careful and 
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prudent business advice of nis sober relatives, he had remained a wealthy 
man. However, with increasing investments into potential quicK profit 
schemes, Sanford's financial portfolio suffered seriously. As Fry states, 
"His tendency toward speculative undertakings in less developed areas of 
the country forecast a pattern that ultimately led to his downfalI." ('55 > 
A relative, William Shelton, wrote him prophetically in 1869 that "no man 
can manage a plantation in Louisiana, shipbuilding in Maine and other 
remotely situated points of business without being ruined. It is a 
simple question of time." (56) Sanford had never "served his 
apprenticeship" so that "he grasped at flashy, faddish, 'get-rich-quick' 
opportunities.. .and failed to give sufficient personal attention to his 
investments(57 > With the depression oi 1873, Sanford's holdings 
seriously declined so that by the mid-1870's he was in search of deals 
that would replenish his financial welfare. (58) Clearly, Sanford regaraed 
Leopold's prospects for the Congo as just the solution he needed to place 
him back on firm financial ground. 
When, in 1876, Leopold convened a conference in Brussels of interested 
explorers, geographers, and delegates from twelve European countries, 
although the United States was not officially represented, allegedly 
standing with Leopold was Henry Shelton Sanford,(59) most likely as an 
aid to Leopold without an official title. 
Preparations by Leopold for the Geographical Conference of Brussels 
were impressive. Along with careful review of the feats of the French, 
German, and British explorers and an indepth study of each country's 
intentions toward Africa, Leopold sent an agent to determine German 
•public opinion toward the proposed conference. Leopold himself travelled 
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to England, to sound out interest in the Contra and to attract to the 
conference delegates who were likelv to agree with his point of view.oiO) 
In his opening speech on September 12, Leopold stated his desire that the 
conference would result in an organization existing tor a purely 
philanthropic purpose in the Congo. According to his speech, Leopold 
wanted to eliminate the slave trade and open the most unknown region of 
Africa to "civilizing" influences. (61) In discussing his aims for the 
Conference and Africa, Leopold stated, 
It will also give me great pleasure to meet the distinguished men whose 
work in favour of civilization I have followed with interest for 
years— Needless to say, in bringing you to Brussels I was in no way 
motivated by selfish designs. No. Gentlemen, if Belgium is small, she 
is happy and contented with her lot. <62) 
Perhaps the Belgian people were content with their nation's size, but 
Leopold certainly was not. No historian accepts Leopold's words at face 
value. Particularly considering Leopold's actions once he had obtained 
complete legal control over the Congo region in 1885, Leopold's professed 
aims at this conference are revealed as tragically comical. Described as 
"crafty" and, a "master at clever propaganda," by appearing to be 
motivated by purely humanitarian impulses, Leopold could accomplish his 
commercial aims and at the same time avoid rousing the suspicions oi the 
other European powers. <63) As one historian emphasizes, the other 
European powers were obvious competitors for land in the Congo region. 
Leopold, however, sought to persuade the European community that his 
organization had no such designs and merely existed to eliminate the 
slave trade, open the region to commerce, and thus introduce civilizing 
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influences into the most remote area oi the "dark continent." <.64) As his 
biographer states, "His tactics were to create an innocuous-seeding 
international structure for the opening up of Central Africa behind which 
he could pursue his own ends." Vhile preventing suspicion on the 
international front—particularly among the British.— these tactics could 
also serve to eliminate a backlash of anti-imperialist sentiment in his 
own country. <65) 
The Conference adopted Leopold's proposal for setting up operational 
posts on the coast of Zanzibar and at the mouth of the Congo. From 
these bases, the international organization would open routes into the 
interior. Along the routes, stations for scientific study and for the 
housing of medical supplies, would be established along with, as Leopold 
stated, "'pacifying' bases from which to abolish the slave trade." <66) 
The most important result of this meeting was the creation of the 
International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Central 
Africa, variously referred to as the International African Association, or 
"The Association," or by its French acronym, AIA. The Association would 
be headed by the International Commission, comprised of the presidents of 
the geographical societies from each participating country and two 
members of the national committees of the AIA. The supreme head of the 
Commission was its president, King Leopold 11.(67) Directing the 
Commission was the Executive Committee, composed of three members 
representing the three language groups, English, Germanic and Latin, plus 
a Secretary-General. (68) Although the initial representative of the 
English language group was British, the British—recognizing the conflict 
participation in such an enterprise might provoke with their own national 
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interests eventually withdrew from the Association. Henry Saniord 
eventually assumed the post. <69.) 'With the close of the Conference, the 
foundation was now laid for Leopold's personal colony. 
V. 
Although Sanford was definitely part of the AIA by 1877, there is no 
direct evidence that Leopold, in the early stages of Sanford's involvement 
with the Congo project, offered Sanford any kind of employment or other 
immediate economic benefits for his efforts. <70) However, as has already 
has been discussed, Sanford's financial situation, by the 1870's, had 
seriously deteriorated. Moreover, at least by 1878, Sanford was looking 
forward to starting a company in the Congo basin once the region was 
sufficiently opened by the King.<71) Thus, one can certainly view 
Sanford's willingness to expend so much time on this project as a form of 
business speculation. By the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, Sanford 
would write to his wife that he expected "important things" for his 
efforts. <72) 
In June, 1877, when Sanford attended the first (and last) meeting, of 
the International Committee of the Association he reported to John 
Latrobe, President of the American national committee of the International 
African Association, on the meeting's developments. Sanford's report is 
an excellent window into not only the activities during the meeting but 
also the mindset of both Americans about the role of the AIA. <73) 
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In the report, Saniord noted that he nad accepted the appointment as 
"sole" delegate to the convention in Brussels, which began on Juiv 20. <.74) 
During the meeting, "convoked...by its President, the King of the Belgians, 
to carry into practice the principles laid down by the Brussels Congress 
last September," plans were made to begin "in Africa...the great work of 
civilization and humanity inaugurated by his Majesty<75) Delegates from 
the U.S. (Sanford), Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, 
Italy, Spain, and Switzerland were present. While Portugal and Russia 
were unable to attend, England made it clear through its absence that it 
desired independence from foreign associations in order to "act for 
itself" in terms of African investment and exploration. (76) Piously, 
Latrobe referred to England's withdrawal from the International 
Association as one resulting from her fear of its "philanthropic" goals 
conflicting with her own interests in new markets. "Nowhere, is this 
want [for new markets] more felt than in England— The work of 
exploration she would willingly keep in her own hands...and take exclusive 
possession of any newly discovered territory." (77) This is a remarkable 
statement in light of Leopold's true aims, where, "with time, the 
enterprise will become...Belgian in name as in actual fact." (78) 
As a result of England's withdrawal, the new representative of the 
English speaking peoples to the Executive Committee became Henry Shelton 
Sanford, due, no doubt, to the fact that he was the only delegate present 
who spoke English as a first language. (79) During the meeting, in 
addition to deciding on exploration into Central Africa from Zanzibar, the 
delegates discussed how each national committee would raise money for the 
Association. (SO) Each local committee was to send money to the National 
Committee on a monthly basis, from which it would be sent to the 
Association, usually after expenses. Funds were to oe raised through 
various means, usually through membership subscriptions. The delegates 
discussed the popularization of exploration into Central Africa by 
circulating "pamphlets calculated to interest the masses." (81) Vith this 
system, where the funds raised bv the national committees were sent to 
the Association, controlled by Leopold, the committees were kept 
impoverished, "and the King am what he could to make good the 
deficiency," according to one historian. (82) In tnis position, the King 
could control all activities of the AIA. (83) 
Sanford continually professed the belief that the selfless aim of the 
Association, and all of its members were solely of a philanthropic nature, 
"with no interests to promote other than those of civilization and 
humanity," and that during this meeting, "the hearty cooperation on their 
part which will be given by other nations came with no aims for conquest 
or aggrandizement." (84) However, it is interesting to note that the 
delegates readily agreed to forego one of the main goals of the 
Association, elimination of the slave trade, in favor of exploration. "To 
exterpate the slave trade, a better trade must be furnished," agreed John 
Latrobe. "Exploration aims at this," and if the Association was successful 
in carrying out its plans for exploration, he stated, "the slave trade 
will die out for want of a market for slaves." (85) The opening of new 
markets for commercial activity had become incorporated into this 
"philanthropic undertaking." 
Moreover, Sanford envisioned other, "special reasons why we of the 
United States should promote actively and earnestly this great work of 
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the International Association." <86) This "peculiar interest" <3v) the 
size ofthe American black population. Sanford, with Latrobe, who was also 
President of the American Colonization Society and an important developer 
of Liberia, believed that it was the role of American blacks to civilize 
Africa. 
?Tear 5,000,000 of our people are of African race—descendants 
l,: slaves; contact with the white races and lately emancipation, 
education, and equality of political rights have made them by 
far superiors of the parent race and will tend to excite a 
spirit of enterprise, ambitions and desires for which central 
Africa opens a wide peculiarly appropriate field. Physically 
they are better adapted than whites to its climate and 
to undergo fatigues...[ it is a topic] well worthy the 
attention of our citizens and our philanthropic spirit." (88) 
"I cordially [agree]," replied Latrobe," to all you say...for more than 
half a century, now, I have been advocating the idea that Africa is to be 
civilized. ..by the emigration on their own cost, of the colored people of 
the United States to that continent." (89) It was this consideration that 
led Latrobe to be so interested in the work of the International African 
Association. (90) 
Finally, during the meeting, the delegates to the International 
Commission violated their own rules and re-elected Leopold as President 
of the Commission, a post that was intended to be held for a single one-
year term. (91) Latrobe, rationalizing this oversight, stated, "This is not 
a case where the American doctrine of "Rotation in Office" is at all 
applicable The King of the Belgians is peculiarly and happily situated. 
The prestige of his name is important now and will continue to be 
important." (92) 
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One last accomplishment oi this first and last meeting of the AIA 
was the adoption of a flag. <93) Leopold and his agents would repeatedly 
refer to the banner as the "blue flag with the gold star floating over 
lands under its civilising direction." Leopold would use the same flag 
for his personal organization, the International Association of the Congo, 
thus furthering the confusion between the two "Associations." The irony 
of the elaborate first and last meeting of the AIA, with its intricate 
organizational structure and philanthropic and international emphasis is 
best symbolized by the adoption and future of its flag. 
Leopold, with this meeting of the International Commission, had 
accomplished everything he wanted so far. The members, as seen in the 
correspondence between Latrobe and Sanford, heartily agreed that this 
"international" and "philanthropic" enterprise should be based in Belgium 
and that its patriarch and president should be Leopold. For the future 
of the AIA, such an elaborate organization needed a devoted leader to call 
meetings and ensure its perpetuation. Unfortunately, this was not on 
Leopold's agenda. Instead, because the King "purposely refrained from 
convoking" the AIA, the committees—particularly the Belgian and the 
French—abandoned the international emphasis and took on their national 
characters with their own expeditions. (94) 
In the meantime, Leopold had acquired a devoted American ally and 
agent in Henry Sanford. At this point the King probably had no concept 
of how important Sanford would be for him in the future. From 1877 on, 
however, Sanford would place himself at Leopold's beckoning. For the 
moment, Sanford made himself available to Leopold when he was needed. 
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Continual reminders of his availability peppered his letters to Leopold. 
Conveniently accessible in his Gingelom chateau, a few miles from 
Leopold's palace in Brussels, Sanford, in the meantime, travelled back and 
forth between Belgium and the United States. He continued to develop his 
struggling citrus investments in Florida and sought unsuccessfully 
through the late 1870's and 1880's to attain a seat from Florida in the 
United States Senate. In the meantime, Sanford continued to invest in 
unsuccessful business deals, such as a Republican newspaper that he 
started in Florida in an attempt to develop a political base for himself. 
The paper ultimately went bankrupt. (95) 
Leopold now devoted his energies to commissioning an explorer to 
survey the Congo basin and assess its economic potential. Stanley, who 
had already predicted great promise for the region, was the obvious 
candidate. Leopold's next assignment for Henry Sanford was as recruiter 
of the explorer's services. 
Chapter II 
Henry Shelton Saniord and Henry Morton Stanley: 
Leopold II secures a diplomat and an explorer 
During the years 1877-1879, Henry Sanford became increasingly 
involved in Leopold's plans for the Congo region. On Henry Morton 
Stanley's return to Europe after spending three years following the Congo 
river from Lake Tanganika in eastern Africa to Boma, in western Africa, 
the world learned of the great commercial potential in the interior of 
Africa. Stanley's letters, aglow with conviction that the Congo region 
was the next great point of commercial exploitation, convinced Leopold 
that Stanley was the explorer that he needed to acquire the land for his 
future colony in Africa. Leopold's American contact, Henry Shelton 
Sanford, who had repeatedly offered his services, became very useful in 
aiding Leopold's acquisition of Stanley's services. In the meantime, 
Leopold took his second and third major steps toward the creation of his 
future state with the creation and dissolution of the Comite D'Etudes du 
Haut Congo and the creation of the International Association of the 
Congo, an organization totally under Leopold's control. 
I. 
While Sanford, in 1877, knew little of Africa, in the ensuing year he 
threw himself into the study of the Congo region and exchanged numerous 
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letters with other members oi the Association.<i > With Baron Greindi, 
the Secretary General of the Executive Committee, Sanford exchanged 
eighteen letters in a seven-month period. (2) By January, 1878, Sanford 
was actively engaged in attracting Stanley to the AIA. (3) 
Stanley had emerged at Boma, three days from the Atlantic coast on 
August 9,1877, having proven Cameron's hypothesis that the rivers Lualaba. 
running from eastern Africa north and the Congo, running from the 
interior of Central Africa south, were one and the same. "On the 31st of 
July, I arrived at a point on the Lower Congo I knew then, beyond 
dispute...that the Lualaba, whose mystery had wooed Livingstone to his 
death, was no other than the 'lucid, long-winding Zaire,'...or the mighty 
Congo." (4) Stanley had departed from Zanzibar on November 12, 1874.(5) 
Three years later to the day, he wrote in the Daily Telegraph, "I could 
prove to you that the Power possessing the Congo, despite the cataracts, 
would absorb to itself the trade of the whole of the enormous basin 
behind. This river is and will be the grand highway of commerce to West 
Central Africa." (6) Thus, Stanley had returned convinced--by what he saw 
in the Congo basin—of its huge economic potential. 
Stanley was not alone in this view. Immediately on his return to 
Europe in January, 1878 the explorer was met at the Marseilles railway 
station by "two Commissioners from his Majesty the King of the Belgians, 
Leopold 11...and before I was two hours older I was made aware that King 
Leopold intended to undertake to do something substantial for Africa, and 
that I was expected to assist him." (7) Those two Commissioners were 
none other than Baron Greindi and Henry Sanford. 
45 
Leopold, had written in November 1877 that, "it the English do not 
forestall our efforts by getting hold of all of Central Africa," he hoped 
to found posts in the Congo, and then "try to transform these posts into 
something like Belgian establishments." (8) In other words, Leopold, in 
1877, already envisioned his future Congo Free State. 
The King hoped that by intercepting Stanley before he reached 
England he could prevent the possibility of Stanley convincing the 
English of the Congo's great economic potential. Thus, Leopold dispatched 
Sanford and Greindl to the Marseilles train station. That evening, after 
meeting Stanley at the Station, Sanford and Greindl were present at the 
reception held for Stanley by the Geographical Society of Marseilles, of 
which both Sanford and Greinal weie honorary members. (9) During the 
reception, Sanford proposed that Stanley join the Association to "continue 
and develop the great work which he [Stanley] had accomplished." <10) 
Leopold's agents then invited Stanley to Brussels to meet the King and 
discuss the explorer's ideas before journeying to London.(11) However, 
Stanley had lost many people during his last mission. He was "slowly 
recovering from the effects of famine and fatigue" and thus met the idea 
"that I should return to the scene of so much disaster and suffering" 
with reluctance.<12) 
Moreover, Stanley had other ideas for the Congo region. Convinced 
that it should be England that took the initiative in the Congo, Stanley 
delayed joining Leopold's enterprise and travelled on to London. Before 
he left, Sanford and Greindl swore Stanley to absolute secrecy about 
their proposition, a promise that he promptly broke. Before Stanley had 
even arrived in London, Greindl read in the Etoile Beige about their 
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invitation to Stanley to visit Brussels before returning to England. (13.' 
One historian suggests that Stanley could not resist the temptation to 
flatter himself as a man in great demand. (14) Also, perhaps, the 
explorer hoped that if the British 
establishment knew of Leopold's interest in the Congo basin they would 
feel a greater sense of urgency and adopt Stanley's plans. 
Stanley "threw himself" into the task of convincing the British 
political and commercial powers to seize the great opportunity offered in 
the Congo. (15) He travelled around England speaking in the major 
commercial centers, particularly Manchester and Liverpool, but as stated 
in his Autobiography, "The Government and the people of England turned a 
deaf ear." (16) 
Sanford in the meantime travelled to the United States. Stanley was 
still bound to his employer, J.G. Bennett, of the New York Herald. 
Leopold coveted Stanley's services but did not want to appear too 
eager. (17) Thus, Leopold instructed Sanford not to openly seek out 
Bennett but that if he "Cbumpled into him by chance" Sanford should 
describe their tentative plans for Stanley. (18) 
Greindl and Leopold, hearing nothing from Stanley, grew restless. (19) 
Stanley must have told Greindl that he would contact him on May 15, after 
his book was published because Greindl wrote to Sanford on May 27 that 
"May 15 passed twelve days ago and we have not spoken to or heard of 
Stanley or his book." (20) Greindl even checked the bookstores for word 
on Stanley's pending publication. (21) Leopold wrote to the Belgian 
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ambassador to England inquiring about the delay and noting that ii a 
much longer time passed they would begin a search for another 
explorer. (22) 
By June, 1878, after a period of rest, during which he wrote 
Through the Dark Continent, Stanley had become restless, and, "with 
restored health, 'liberty' became insipid and joyless, that luxury of 
lounging which had appeared desirable to an ill-regulated and unhealthy 
fancy became unbearable." (23) Having received "no help or 
encouragement from Britain" in his quest to open the Congo region to 
"legitimate and wholesome commerce," (24) Stanley, on June 11, 1878, 
finally presented himself to King Leopold. (25) Sanford realized 
Stanley's change of heart was due to his lack of success in convincing 
the British commercial and political establishment to support his plans 
for the Congo. Referring to Stanley's lobbying activities in England in 
the preceding months, Sanford wrote Greindl that "his [Stanley's] 
escapades...in England will not have added to his popularity or excited 
any argument in his favor for employment on the part of the 
English."(26) Thus Sanford recognized that Stanley's well known failure 
in convincing the British had eroded his bargaining position with 
Leopold. "All will probably depend on the wishes and determination of 
the King," wrote Sanford. (27) 
The year 1878 marked the planning stages for the first expedition 
to the Congo commissioned by King Leopold. Stanley's first meeting 
with Leopold marked the first major step toward the expedition. Until 
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June, there had been no definitive plan for the Congo Basin. During the 
June meeting, however, Stanley proposed the creation of a company for 
the purpose of building a railroad to by-pass the cataracts on the 
lower part of the Congo River. For transport on the upper part of the 
river, Stanley believed that steamships would be the best choice, with 
trading stations set up intermittently along the route. The meeting 
proceeded well and Leopold, according to Greindl, was "disposed" to back 
such a company. Greindl was also impressed with Stanley's 
propositions, terming them "practical" and predicting success. (28) 
II. 
Until September, the International African Association remained the 
only organization in existence relating to the exploration of the Congo 
region. The Belgian committee undertook an expedition from Zanzibar, 
establishing a station on Lake Tanganika. (29) However, the King's 
plans had now progressed beyond simple exploration. These plans 
required considerable funds, which still had to be raised. Moreover, 
Leopold needed a more Belgian-centered group that would function in 
accordance with his direct purposes. He and Greindl began canvassing 
for subscribers for a new organization. (30) 
In the meantime, Leopold, responding to Sanford's offer of service, 
asked Sanford to act as an intermediary between Stanley and 
Leopold. (31) Stanley didn't speak French, and Sanford shared Stanley's 
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adopted nationality. Thus, Sanford and Stanley embarked upon a period 
of interviews and correspondence, while the Baron kept Sanford apprised 
of any new developments in Brussels to relate to Stanley. 
During this period, Leopold seems to have been entertaining two 
possible avenues. His Dutch supporters condoned commissioning a 
"preliminary" expedition, in which specialists would be sent to assess 
the economic opportunities along the Congo. His alternative was to 
embark upon a full-fledged permanent expedition and establish trading 
stations. 
Stanley made it very clear to Sanford that he was only interested 
in the latter alternative. (.32) He told Sanford that if "unacclimated, 
untried specialists" were sent to the Basin without established 
stations prepared for them that they would certainly meet with 
disaster. Stanley wanted to return to the Congo, establish permanent 
stations, and then receive the specialists. As the specialists moved 
deeper into the basin, Stanley would precede them and establish more 
stations. Morever, Stanley had no intention of embarking on a return 
expedition to the Congo without some sort of "guarantee for the future." 
He sought a five-year contract, at a salary of $1,000 per year, and on 
assurance that the "philanthropic" aspect of the enterprise would 
continue, "no matter what the result of the commercial and R.R. 
expedition." (33) If Leopold was merely interested in another 
exploratory expedition like that from which he had just returned, 
Stanley was not interested in giving up a proposed lecture 
contract. (34) Stanley also convinced Sanford, who saw the creation of 
a "smaller, permanent expedition," as the perfect approach to which the 
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King's name would be "affixed to it for all time," and "it couid be 
utilized for the reconnaissance and for commerce and the railroad.. .arid 
be much more than self-sustaining by trade."<35) 
In August, 1878, Stanley met Leopold's commissioners in Paris where 
he further described his plans for the Congo. "It is from this 
meeting, which took place in August, that I date the formation of the 
project of the first enterprise of the Congo," Stanley would later 
write. (36) 
In November Leopold summoned Stanley to Brussels where, with 
Dutch, French and German, and British capitalists, the foundation was 
laid for the "Comite d'Etudes du Haut Congo, <Committee to Study the 
Upper Congo) a Belgian-based organization with mainly Belgian-Dutch 
backing and the King as Honorary President. In addition, Colonel 
Strauch, General Secretary of the AIA, was now also President of the 
Comite. (37) On November 25, Leopold met again with his financial 
backers, and the Comite was officially established. (38) Leopold chose 
a compromise between the ideas of Stanley and the Dutch capitalists. 
The proposed expedition—to be led by Stanley—would both explore the 
region for economic opportunities and create bases between the lower 
Congo and Stanley Pool. If the studies confirmed the assumed 
commercial benefits the Comite backers would form two companies, one 
company to build a connection—most likely a railroad—between the 
Lower and the Upper Congo, and the other to establish commercial 
enterprises and navigation on the Upper Congo. (39) 
In the meantime, through October and November, Stanley and Sanford 
exchanged letters discussing the goals and costs of the proposed 
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enterprise. By January 2, 1S79, the details were worked out and, "it 
was resolved that I [Stanley] should lead an exploring expedition into 
Western Africa along the Congo." (40) Sanford does not seem to have 
attended any of these meetings because Stanley wrote to him on 
February 27, from Alexandria, that "you must know that on January 2, 
1879, a council was formed called the "Commission d'Etude du Haut 
Congo." (41) 
Stanley apparently completely failed to recognize Leopold's goal of 
creating a Belgian organization for the purpose of exploiting the Congo 
region. He voiced regret that Leopold had been unable to find American 
subscribers for this "international enterprise" and even recommended to 
the King that Leopold donate a certain amount of money in Sanford's 
name "for it is essential that we also get a few Americans.. .[to] 
purchase the right by this expression of sympathy to supply Africa's 
greatest River for Commerce." (42) Little did he know that both Leopold 
and Sanford had great hopes for divesting the Comite completely of 
those few subscribers that it already had. 
III. 
At this point the history of the International African Association 
and the Comite D'Etudes becomes very murky. While the AIA had 
explorations already underway on the eastern coast of central Africa, 
starting from Zanzibar, Stanley's plans for the Comite were for the 
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west coast, starting from Banana, at the mouth of the Congo River. 
Stanley seems to have believed at this point that the Comite was a 
branch of the AIA. In fact it could be said that the Belgian National 
Committee of the AIA was renamed the Comite d 'Etudes du Haut-Congo, as 
the leadership of both Committees was basically the same and the 
Belgian National Committee ceased to exist with the creation of the 
Comite. However, the national committees of the AIA were never 
informed of this new creation, the Comite.i43) Moreover, by its very 
name, as Stanley points out in The Congo, one can see ti^at there was a 
completely different area of emphasis under the Comite. (44) The AIA 
was principally interested in exploration of the east coast while the 
Comite, as noted, after some struggle, chose to center on the west coast 
and the upper Congo River. Moreover, the Comite assumed a much more 
commercial look than the AIA, as it was backed primarily by large scale 
capitalists and was devoted to the study of commercial possibilities 
and founding a railway company. (45) However, through 1885 the two 
titles were continally interspersed as though connected, whenever 
Sanford or any of Leopold's agents referred to Leopold's organization. 
Further complicating the names of the organizations was that, as 
soon as Stanley left for Africa, under the auspices of the Comite, that 
organization was dissolved, the subscriptions returned, and a new title 
unveiled. "The International Association of the Congo," by 1881, was 
attached to Leopold's phantom organization, but deliberate confusion 
would be perpetuated by Leopold, Sanford, and the rest of the King's 
agents. Throughout, the associates referred to the organization as 
either the "International" or the "Association," allowing outsiders to 
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decide, according to preference, which society they were dealing wiin. 
Leopold, wrote, "care must be taken not to let it be obvious that the 
Association du Congo and the Association Africaine CAIA] are two 
different things." <46) 
Sanford carefully followed these instructions. In convincing 
Secretary of State Frelinghuysen of his legitimate role, Sanford would 
write to him in 1882, "I beg to recall the fact that I am a member of 
the executive committee of the African International Association." (47) 
As late as 1884, Sanford would, in a letter to Senator Morgan of 
Alabama, refer to the Comite d'Etudes not only as a branch uf tim 
African International association also as a functioning body, 
althoug h it had been defunct for five years. (48) As late as 1885 
Stanley would still call Leopold's organization, now forming as the 
Congo Free State, the "Comite." (49) No matter which organization was 
in discussion, they were in reality singly referring to King Leopold II 
of the Belgians. As the historian Stanley Thompson states, "the 
Belgian Committee tof the AIA] was evidently the Comite d 'Etudes du 
Haut-Congo, that is to say Leopold II." (50) 
IV. 
How did Leopold dissolve the Comite? Vhen, in May, 1879 the Dutch 
firm, the Afrikaansche Handelsvereeniging—Dutch African Company—a 
primary backer of the Comite, collapsed, Sanford eagerly suggested to 
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Leopold that he take This opportunity to rid the organization oi 
backers altogether. On hearing of the "catastrophe that has befallen 
the Dutch African Company," Sanford, who was in New York at the time, 
rushed back to the Continent, "It appears to me that an occasion has 
been furnished to be relieved of a charge I do not, therefore, view 
the bankruptcy as a misfortune, but the contrary as giving an 
opportunity to be freed. (51) Thompson goes so far as to suggest that 
because of this advice to Leopold, Sanford might be credited as the 
progenitor behind the eventual sole ownership by Leopold of the Congo 
basin. (52) 
During the annual meeting in November, 1879, Leopold made his move. 
Emphasizing that most of the subscription money had been drained in 
the initial exploration stages earlier in the year, Leopold was able to 
sufficiently frighten the Comite backers. Through Leon Lambert (a 
Belgian banker, who, acting for Leopold, had become co-founder of the 
Comite). Leopold offered to return the subscribers' original investments 
and absolve them of financial responsibility if they would, in return, 
agree to dissolve the Comite. The shareholders happily agreed and the 
Comite d'Etudes du Haut-Congo no longer existed. (53) Leopold had 
established the illusion of a philanthropic, international, "Association" 
supposedly motivated soley by a desire to "civilize" Central Africa. 
The Comite's dissolution remained a secret and Leopold was now free to 
pursue his self aggrandizing aims of establishing a personal colony. 
Chapter III 
Henry Shelton Sanford: 
Public Businessman, Private Diplomat 
Leopold assumed sole control and financial responsibility over the 
Congo project. The enterprise now began to shape into the project 
that Leopold had envisioned all along. Iz was "not a question of 
Belgian colonies [but of] creating a new State, as big as Dossible and 
of running it."(l) To accomplish this dream, Leopold needed to succeed 
at two crucial tasks: first, the physical acquisition of land for his 
future state; and second, the acquisition of world acceptance. It would 
be two Americans, Henry Stanley and Henry Sanford, who would succeed 
in attaining both of these goals. In the next six years, Stanley, 
intrepid, determined, and with moral conviction, would systematically 
make treaties with the chiefs along the Congo river, thus giving 
Leopold a hold on which to base his claims. Simultaneously, Sanford, 
energetic, powerfully connected, and keenly aware of the financial 
benefits he might reap, would lobby the United States government, 
through a combination of persuasion and deception, to recognize 
Leopold's claims in the Congo. Sanford appealed to specific interest 
groups, particularly advocates of American economic expansion and the 
colonization of American blacks. In addition, he cultivated the 
confusion between the international, philanthropic AIA and Leopold's 
personally controlled AIC, allowing supporters to believe they were 
advocating the recognition of the neutral, international, AIA. The 
resulting U.S. recognition helped legitimize Leopold' organization, and 
set a precedent that other nations would follow. 
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The first goal, according to Leopold, was to be achieved by 
establishing the already planned three stations along the Congo River 
and forming them "into a Free State to which may be added further 
stations and settlements beyond the immediate limits of the Congo." (2) 
Concurrently he began dissociating himself from the purely 
philanthropic ideals that some of his associates continued voicing. 
Sanford had written Leopold in June, suggesting that because the Dutch 
African Company's "main motive" was to exploit the "Association," the 
company's failure marked a positive development. He believed that "in 
the eyes of the world," the Dutch company's organization removed from 
the enterprise "that high and philanthropic character which was its 
purpose." For Sanford, this was a further reason for Leopold to drop 
his subscribers altogether. <3) Stanley also continued to worry about 
actions taken by the "International" as appearing too commercial and 
less philanthropic.<4) Leopold, dissolute, decided the time had arrived 
to lessen the emphasis on the philanthropic objectives. (5) While 
baldly stating that "there is no question of granting the slightest 
political power to negroes," the King simultaneously appealed to those 
Europeans who were eager to eliminate the slave trade but gazed toward 
unfortunate Liberia as the revealing result of native rule. The ideal 
solution seemed to be black states under the protectorate of European 
powers. <6) 
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From his personal fortune, in part amassed through shrewd 
speculation, Leopold funded the land acquisition he now pushed Stanley 
to carry out in the Congo basin. But Leopold continued to hide his 
true motives from the explorer. Quixotic and naive, Stanley continued 
to believe that he was working for the "international" Comite. As late 
as December 1881, Leopold wrote to Stanley, "Belgium desires no 
territory in Africa, but it is indispensable you should purchase for the 
Comite d'Etudes as much land as you will be able to obtain "(7) As 
one historian notes, "Having thus lent his own money to himself, 
Leopold naturally retained a control over the capital of the [future] 
Free State.." (8) 
Stanley arrived at the mouth of the Congo on August, 14, 1879. In 
the next three years he opened a route along the Congo stretching from 
the Atlantic Ocean to Stanley Pool. Along the way he founded the 
stations of Vivi, Isangila, Manyanga, and Mswata.(9) However, Leopold 
was impatient with Stanley's progress, believing his heavily laden 
method of travel caused him to move too slowly compared with the 
movements of rival explorers in the region. The King also believed 
that Stanley was insufficiently driven to claim territory, and 
continually exhorted Stanley to be more aggressive in land 
acquisition. (10) In 1880 Leopold was shocked to find that Stanley was 
moving only 22 miles a month. Realizing De Brazza's greater speed and 
foreseeing his probable goal of claiming Stanley Pool, Leopold ordered 
Stanley to cease building roads and stations and make a direct plunge 
toward the inland sea. Stanley, however, ignored Leopold's orders. (11) 
The King wrote to Stanley in December, 1861, 
"you should place under the suzerainty of that Comite 
Cthey still had not bothered to inform Stanley of the 
fact that the Comite no longer existed] as soon as 
possible and without losing a minute, all the chiefs from 
the mouth of the Congo to Stanley Falls. Brazza in a very 
short time has placed under his dependence the chiefs 
around Stanley pool. Should we not do as much for the 
Comite?" <12) 
Stanley did finally reach his destination. By March, 1682, he had 
created the most important of the stations linking the Upper and Lower 
Congo on the southern shore of Stanley Pool, and named it Leopoldville 
(now Kinshasa). While De Brazza's Makako treaty covered the north side 
of the pool, Stanley's treaties lined the southern side. On partition, 
Leopold's state and the future French Equatorial Africa would be 
divided down the middle of part of the river and the pool. On the 
north shore, a town would be named "Brazzaville." Both towns became 
the capitals of the new colonies once the European powers achieved full 
partition. 
With the creation of Leopoldville, Stanley's crew began trading 
with the natives. <13) The King was still displeased, however. He wrote 
Colonel Strauch in October, "The terms of the native chiefs do not 
satisfy me. There must at least be added an article to the effect that 
they delegate to us their sovereign rights over the territories." <14) 
Stanley fell ill and returned to Europe in September, 1882. After 
some persuasion on the part of Leopold, the explorer resumed 
exploration the Congo in December, 1882, and in the process outflanked 
de Brazza who had also returned to Europe. <15) 
Cumetime near the end of 1882 or the beginning of 1883, Leopold 
renamed his elusive organization the International Association oi the 
Congo, or AIC.<16) By the end of 1883, in the name of the AIC, Stanley 
successfully forestalled the Portuguese and French threat of 
superceding Leopold's goals in the interior. As Stanley travelled along 
the Congo, using a combination of bribery and force of arms, he 
established a string of stations and completed treaties with the 
surrounding tribal chiefs. Arriving at Stanley Falls and creating 
Stanleyville, over one thousand miles into the interior, he completed 
the dominant position over the Upper Congo that Leopold sought. (.17) 
The court in Brussels was ecstatic at Sanley's triumph. Leopold's 
secretary, Jules Devaux, wrote to Sanford, "Stanley has been successful 
in founding in a pacific way a new station at the Stanley Falls. You 
see that we are progressing very fast toward the fulfillment of the 
1876 program."<18) However, without international recognition, the 
treaties and stations that Stanley had completed remained in a 
precarious position. Moreover, as Stanley conquered the interior, the 
mouth of the river became increasingly vulnerable. When in February, 
1884, Britain and Portugal signed the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, it 
appeared that Leopold's state, even when finally officially recognized, 
might still be at the mercy of the English and Portuguese, Without 
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free entry and exit into the Congo basin by way of the river's mouth, 
the future Congo Free State could become a prison. Without 
international recognition and acceptance of Leopold's apparent goals, 
the future of his independent state was doomed. If Leopold could 
attain this international acceptance, Britain and Portugal could be 
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blocked from "corking" the Free State. Henry Shelton Sanford now 
became a crucial figure. 
II. 
Sanford had become very useful to Leopold as Stanley laid claim to 
the Congo interior. Through unacknowledged methods, as Sanford said, 
"details...related to me by one who had seen them," he obtained for 
Leopold information from letters written by De Brazza to his family, 
thus helping to keep Leopold apprised of much of De Brazza's 
competitive activities in the region.(19) 
From Sanford, in part, Leopold learned of the powerful French 
interest in attaining free access to the mouth of the Congo river. 
"For a permanent way and outlet for the world's commerce," Sanford 
wrote, "the mouth of the Congo will doubtless prove to be the best-
that the French will now strive to open the way marked out by their 
traveller [De Brazza] is probable—it will be very important for the 
prosperity of their colony, Gabon. It is to be hoped they will not be 
too prompt about it ."(20) 
As the French threat grew, Leopold harnessed Sanford's contacts and 
willingness to employ his stature as former U.S. minister to Belgium. 
In November 1882, the series of treaties that de Brazza had made with 
Congo chiefs in 1880 and 1881 in the name of the French were finally 
ratified by the Quai d'Qrsay. (21) This apparent "policy of penetration 
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in Africa" now posed a particular threat to the Congo mission. (22) 
Thus, in December, Sanford wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State, 
Frederick Frelinghuysen, asking that the State Department inquire of 
the French government "respecting the so called Treaty of De Brazza." 
Through Frelinghuysen, Sanford, under the pretext of inquiring about 
French intentions for the new territory, hoped to convince the U.S. 
government of the threat to its interests posed by France's latest 
actions. Referring to the ratification of De Brazza's treaties as a 
French "assumption...based upon the flimsy and specious pretext of a 
treaty with an ignorant chief, who denies any knowledge of the 
transaction," Sanford warned Frelinghuysen against ignoring this French 
behavior. "We could afford to pass over [France's assumptions] without 
notice, did they affect in no way the interests of this country and its 
people," he wrote. (23) 
At the same time that Sanford performed these services for Leopold, 
he continued to remind the monarch that he was "at all times entirely 
at your disposal in any way where I can be of service." (24) Leopold now 
had a concrete mission for Sanford to accomplish: to gain American 
recognition for his organization, the future Congo Free State. 
III. 
As early as 1882, Leopold had Sanford laying the groundwork for 
gaining United States recognition of the International Association of 
the Congo. In a letter to Secretary of State Frelinghuysen in late 
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i88^, Sanford revealed not only Leopold's strategy for acquiring 
recognition of the AIL,, but also Sanford's willingness to distort the 
truth in order to achieve Leopold's goals. Writing, as Sanford stated, 
"on behalf of no one, only as an American citizen desirous to see his 
country participate its full shart in the importsnt results to tallow 
from what is now going in Africa," Sanford emphasized to Frelinghuysen 
that the "'great commercial powers'' were going to have to make a 
decision over the question of "what is to be done with regard to the 
Congo." (25) If the U.S. would recognize the flag of their international 
organization, rather than allow the Congo to fall into the hands of 
individual nations motivated by "greed, rapacity and the desire to 
offset cheaply abroad marketing humiliations at home," it would help 
decide the question. Once the U.S. recognized the international flag of 
the "International Association," it "could be assured, Great Britain has 
given too many examples in this way of doing business for herself not 
to assent to receive such an Embassy if we would." Once the U.S. and 
Great Britain recognized the flag of the "Association," the assent of 
these two nations would naturally draw in that of Germany and other 
powers would doubtless follow." (26) 
Unbeknownst to Frelinghuysen, Sanford also revealed another tenet 
of Leopold's strategy in his letter to the Secretary of State. Secrecy 
as to the nature of the AIC remained of grave importance. Emphasizing 
an international flavor of the enterprise—the concept of a Free State 
open to the commercial use of all powers, but at the same time kept 
under control by one organization, remained the most palatable and 
saleable attribute of the Association. (27) Thus, when referring to the 
organization in question, Leopold and his agents continued to employ 
the term African International Association, although that organization 
had not had a meeting of its international committees since 1877, and 
the committees themselves had long since competed against each other 
in the Congo for territory. De Brazza had explored under the auspices 
of the French Committee of the AIA, while the Belgian committee had 
become the Comite D'Etudes du Haut-Congo, which also had been defunct 
since 1879. However, in his letter to Frelinghuysen, Sanford referred 
to the AIA as though it remained a thriving international organization. 
"I am a member of the executive committee of the African International 
Association founded by the King of the Belgians for the purpose of 
opening up equatorial Africa to civilizing influences by a series of 
ports to stretch across from ocean to ocean." <28) Sanford continued to 
expound on the international nature of this enterprise and described in 
detail the composition of the organization. "This society has branches 
in most civilized countries and on this continent of Europe are 
generally presided over by members of their reigning families (in 
France by M. De Lesseps and in the United States by M. Latrobe of 
Baltimore and It. Daly of New York." (29) Never referring to the "AIC", 
Sanford continued to describe the composition of the basically defunct 
"AIA". Thus, in continual references to the "Association," while Sanford 
and Leopold were referring to the AIC, those they were entreating for 
recognition were hearing the "AIA." 
In the same letter to Frelinghuysen, Sanford emphasized Stanley's 
American citizenship, thus further employing the specific tactics that 
would become common in his arguments to convince the U.S. to take a 
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greater interest in African affairs. Although Stanley was never a 
naturalized American citizen. Leopold and Sanford continually 
manipulated Stanley's status as an American explorer to bolster their 
argument that United States had a right and duty to involve itself in 
the Congo mission. Stanley, in fact, chose to regard himself as an 
American citizen. 
Stanley had been born in England as John Rowlands. Abandoned by 
his family, he eventually made it to the U.S. where he was taken in and 
raised as an American. The name he eventually took as his own was 
that of his surrogate parent, Henry Morton Stanley. After finding 
Livingstone in Ujiji in 1871, he had returned to England which he 
apparently, regardless of his American benefactor in the U.S., still 
regarded as home. However, in England, his accomplishment was greeted 
with scorn and scepticism. The President of the Royal Geographical 
Society even wrote that Stanley hadn't discovered Livingstone but that 
Livingstone had discovered Stanley. (30) From this point on, Stanley 
began to emphasize American mannerisms and characteristics and 
increasingly took on the persona of an American. (31) However, although 
he stated at one point, "I am undoubtedly a citizen of the United 
States, I claim and possess all rights of an American citizen," (32) he, 
in fact, for most of his life was a man without a country. In 1885 
Stanley would learn that he never had official American citizenship, 
would resume British citizenship and even become a member of 
Parliament late in life. (33) 
Any question of Stanley's American citizenship was inconsequential 
to Leopold and Sanford, however. They needed Stanley to be American 
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and they used this assumption for all it was worth. Sanford wrote to 
Frelinghuysen, "But the Congo, discovered by an American, [Stanley], now 
engaged in opening it to civilization and the whole world under the 
direction and the lavish, unselfish expenditure of the philanthropic 
King of the Belgians without any restriction—the United States has a 
lively interest in." <34) Such an argument was very effective. John 
Kasson, Minister to Austria, was very struck by the fact that an 
"American" had opened the Congo to the world's view and chastized the 
U.S. government for not being as energetic and imaginitive in its 
foreign policy as its citizen, Stanley, was in his explorations. <35) 
During the campaign for American recognition of the Free State, 
repeated references to Stanley's American citizenship would appear in 
the letters and reports issued by the Secretary of State and President 
Arthur seeking to bolster their argument that the United States should 
recognize the Association. Sanford's emphasis on the United States's 
obligation to support an American explorer's efforts thus proved very 
successful. 
Sanford's next tactic was to emphasize the great economic 
opportunities available to American business interests. "It is to that 
vast river and its tributaries," he wrote, "exceeding our own 
Mississippi in extent and agricultural resources, teeming with a 
population estimated by Mr. Stanley at 80,000,000 of [sic] people 
'thirsting for trade' it is to that...more than any hithero unoccupied 
part of the inhabitable globe that we are to look for relief from the 
overproduction which now threatens us in some of our manufactures." <36) 
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Implied in Sanford's words, was the philanthropic dutv of the U.S. 
government to recognize the "Association." Particularly with the large 
black papulation of the United States, it was the duty of the American 
government to support an organization devoted to the elimination of the 
slave trade. King Leopold II, this "liberal and large-minded Prince," 
had selflessly donated his time and money to completing this necessary 
civilizing enterprise, according to Sanford. He "is expending about a 
million annually for this benefit of humanity and of civilization with 
the unselfish desire that all the civilized world may participate 
equally in the benefits to be derived." According to Sanford, King 
Leopold would happily continue with the current situation if it were 
not for acquisitive infringers waiting to take advantage of his 
benevolence. "I say that the flag of the Association would suffice, and 
protect the work for the benefit of all, but public attention having 
now been directed to the Congo and greed [and] rapacity...are not to 
permit this peaceful work to go on undisturbed." (37) Thus, it was up to 
the "great commercial powers," such as the U.S. to save the Congo basin 
and recognize the sovereignty of the Association in that region, and 
thus "recognize the importance of civilization and commerce." (38) 
Thus, as early as 1882, in attempting to convince the American 
government of its duty to recognize the Association, Sanford had 
emphasized three compelling arguments, the fact that its explorer, 
Stanley, was an "American," the great economic opportunities available 
to those countries that threw their support to the AIA, and the 
philanthropic spirit behind the organization in its desire to "introduce 
civilizing influences" and eliminate the slave trade in Africa. 
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In convincing the American private sector oi the need to recognize 
the Association, Sanford directed his persuasive arguments to two more 
powerful interest groups, those who continued to regard African 
colonization as a solution to what they considered to be the "negro 
problem" and those who believed that the United States should take a 
greater interest in international affairs and thus take its rightful 
place as a world power as a means of eliminating the nation's 
impending trade surplus. Three figures who represented these ideas and 
played roles in the United States's recognition of the Association and 
participation in the Berlin Vest African Conference are John Latrobe, 
John Tyler Morgan, and John A. Kasson. Both John Latrobe, President of 
the American Colonization Society, and Alabama Senator John Tyler 
Morgan were greatly interested in the colonization potential of the 
Congo. Sanford had already emphasized this possibility to Latrobe. 
Morgan was also a strong economic expansionist whose chief interest, 
along with John Kasson, lay in America's international responsibility to 
expand economically. Kasson, expressing his opinion in articles for 
the North American Review, believed that it was time for the U.S. to 
assert itself as a world power and secure markets for American 
manufacturers. Sanford would appeal to each of their specific 
interests and in the process gain strong support for American 
recognition of the AIA. 
Sanford's greatest work in this area lay in the future, with his 
"Washington Campaign," when he would travel to the U.S. capitol and 
systematically convince these varied interest groups of the need to 
secure the neutrality of the Congo region by recognizing the AIC. At 
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this time, he concentrated on preparations for the campaign. <.39) 
Evidence points to Colonel Strauch (40,41) as having conceived the idea 
of sending Sanford to Washington. (42) As early as May, 1883, Strauch 
seems to have been thinking in this vein when he had Sanford read 
copies of the Antislavery Review and thus get a feel of the national 
sentiment at the moment. (43) Sanford certainly believed that something 
should be done to block an Anglo-Portuguese grasp on the Congo mouth. 
Devaux wrote him, "As you say, if such a good thing can be done, there 
is no time to be lost, for I strongly suspect that the French and 
Portuguese are very much engaged in carrying out some mischief which 
might smash us at once." (44) 
The initial step toward the "Washington Campaign" was a letter 
drafted to President Arthur by Leopold, which Sanford translated. The 
letter suggested that Arthur consider sending an American Consul to the 
Congo area. A follow up letter was drafted by Leopold in June and 
translated by Sanford offering to pay the consul from the funds of the 
"International Association." (45) Arthur responded to these letters by 
expressing deep interest in the work of the AIC and promising to 
explore the possibility of recognition of the AIC. (46) 
Leopold continued to woo Arthur, keeping him apprised on the 
progress of the Association in Africa. "I am encouraged to further 
inform you," he wrote, "that the work of the Association in Africa 
continues to be rapidly and pacifically developed." (47) 
Sanford not only translated Leopold's letters but also offered 
valuable advice to Leopold regarding wording and content. This is seen 
clearly in the case of the next letter written to President Arthur in 
October, 1883. Leopold dictated the letter to Sanford. Sanford, while 
translating, compiled a set of suggestions for Leopold to consider. 
The original draft by Leopold and the final copy, sent to Arthur, 
provide an excellent example of Sanford's editing. Sanford's notes, 
referring to the conclusion of the letter, advised Leopold that he make 
the last lines more forceful and suggested that Leopold add to the 
phrase "the blue standard with the golden star, [the flag of the 
Association] the words, "which now floats over 17 stations, many 
territories, steamers engaged in the civilizing work of the Association 
and over a population of several millions." Almost the exact words 
appear in the final draft delivered to Arthur. (48) 
Colonel Strauch compiled Sanford's extensive dossier of diplomatic 
documentation to present to the U.S. government and the various 
interest groups from whom Sanford sought help. (49) In the meantime, the 
King and Sanford worked to perfect the letter requesting that Arthur 
consider recognizing the Association as the protector and insurer of 
neutrality in the claimed region. Leopold dictated the rough draft to 
Sanford and Sanford translated and revised. 
I wish...to renew the proposition I made to you and to add 
another. I would be pleased by a convention or a declaration 
of the International Association, representing the states of the 
Congo, before mentioned, to assure to the United States freedom 
from customs duties upon all products of your country into our 
independent territories, and that citizens of the United States shall 
have full liberty, while conforming themselves to the laws of those 
territories, to acquire and occupy lands, to trade there. 
and to enjoy therein all privileges which may hereafter 
be given to the citizens or subjects of other 
nations. We would be glad to accept 
from the United States, in such a form that may be deemed 
proper, by letter or by treaty, our proposal to your 
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country. Also the official announcement that the Government 
of the United States has given to its agents on land and 
sea instructions to treat as a friendly (and if possible as 
a neutral one) the blue standard with the golden star which 
now floats over 17 stations, many territories, 7 
steamers engaged in the civilizing work of the Association and over 
a population of several millions. (50) 
Finally, by mid-November, armed with the completed letter to the 
President and an extensive dossier, Sanford was ready to depart for 
Washington with high hopes of successfully completing the "Washington 
Campaign." Included in his papers was an elaborate code devised by 
Strauch. Sanford was to periodically telegraph Brussels in code with 
updates on his progress. (51) Arriving in New York on November, 27, 
1883, Strauch cabled to Sanford, "We had no Joseph at spot occupied by 
Louis. Hand the letter...William(52) Translated, the telegraph seems 
to say, "We had no sovereign right at the spot occupied by Portugal." 
"William" was code for Strauch, while "Hand the letter" presumably 
merely reminded Sanford to travel directly to Washington and 
personally deliver Leopold's letter to Arthur. 
IV. 
Sanford needed to direct his attention towards the executive 
branch, specifically President Arthur and his Secretary of State, 
Frederick Frelinghuysen, and the legislative branch and private sector, 
represented for the purposes of this study by Alabama Senator John 
Tyler Morgan, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
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John Latrobe, president of the American Colonization Society, John 
Kasson, the future delegate to the Berlin Conference, and Charles P. 
Daly, president of the American Colonization Society and with strong 
ties to the New York Chamber of Commerce. 
In terms of the President, "The Washington Campaign" succeeded 
almost immediately. Within days of delivering Leopold's letter, Leopold 
and his agents were rewarded in the President's Message. On December 
4, 1883, Arthur, standing before Congress, stated, 
The rich and populous valley of the Congo is being 
opened to commerce by a society called the International 
African Association, of which the King of the Belgians 
is the president and a citizen of the United States the chief 
executive officer. Large tracts of territory have been 
ceded to the Association by native chiefs, roads have been opened, 
steam boats placed on the river, and the nuclei of states established 
at twenty-two stations under one flag which offers freedom of 
commerce and prohibits the slave trade. The objects of the society 
are philanthropic. It does not aim at permanent political control, 
but seeks the neutrality of the valley. The United States cannot be 
indifferent to this work nor to the interest of their citizens 
involved in it. It may became advisable for us to cooperate with 
other commercial powers in promoting the rights of trade and 
residence in the Congo Valley free from the interference or political 
control of one nation. (53) 
This statement by no means suggested recognizing the Association 
as a sovereign power over territory in the region. However, Arthur 
clearly displayed a conviction that Portuguese pretensions of 
sovereignty in the region, with or without English backing, were 
unacceptable. The address marked a spirited step in the desired 
direction. It also incorporates every point of Sanford's strategy aimed 
toward the government. From freedom of commerce, to the elimination oi 
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the elave trade, to reference to the "African International Association,' 
each of Sanford's campaign tactics were referred to in Arthur's speech. 
Devaux wrote to Sanford in glee, "The king wishes me to say that 
nothing could be better than what the President said in his message, 
and that H.M. is a thousand times obliged to you for having obtained 
it." <54) With the President in his corner, Sanford now headed for the 
State Department, where Frederick Frelinghuysen had been receptive to 
Sanford's overtures since late 1882. Frelinghuysen had enlisted 
Sanford's aid in drafting the Congo portion of the president's message 
and thus already displayed a belief that Portuguese and British claims 
in the region were unacceptable. <55) Now, Sanford needed to convince 
Frelinghuysen of the benefits to the U.S. that recognition of a 
sovereign and viable "neutral" organization in the Congo could provide-
-a state protecting the freedom of trade in the region for all powers 
and at the same time "civilizing" and maintaining stability in the 
region. 
Sanford had been approaching the U.S. State Department in relation 
to neutrality in the Congo since 1881. He wrote to Secretary of State 
James G. Blaine, concerning "steps [that] should be taken to protect our 
prospective commerce with that region...by protesting against its 
military occupation by any power..and...by an understanding with the 
commercial powers against the exclusive sovereignty ...by any nation and 
the free and unrestrictive intercourse of all." (56) Blaine, while 
expressing himself as an economic expansionist, centered his energies 
in the Western Hemisphere, where he hoped "to cultivate such friendly 
commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a 
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large increase in the export trade of the United States" (57) and thus 
showed little interest in commercial prospects in Africa. 
While little had come of his overtures to Blaine, Sanford had 
stepped up the pressure in 1882 with the new Secretary of State, 
emphasizing the increasing power struggles centered around the Congo. 
Frelinghuysen, even more than Blaine, was a firm economic expansionist. 
While also devoting much of his efforts to South America (he signed an 
agreement with Nicaragua for an American-Nicaraguan canal, stating, "It 
opens the markets of Asia and the west coast of South America to the 
manufacturers of the Atlantic seaboard."), Frelinghuysen was open to the 
idea of turning American eyes and markets toward the African 
interior. (58) 
As already noted, Sanford had made his first overture to 
Frelinghuysen in December, 1882, when, concerned about French 
pretensions, he wrote, "I feel assured that the watchful solicitude of 
yourself and our own government will not allow to pass unheeded any 
attempt to secure exclusive privileges in that region by any power; 
great or petty ."(59) 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1883, he wrote to 
Frelinghuysen, updating him on the progress in Parliament of the Anglo-
Portuguse treaty. "I believe the question of a treaty with Portugal has 
not been abandoned;" he wrote, "Portugal shall give a foothold for 
British influences," and he suggested that Frelinghuysen inquire of 
Britain as to her intentions. "There might be a point of departure on 
[their?] side in sounding out the British Govt, as to some harmonious 
action in the protection of commerce and the civilizing influences at 
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work there" he wrote. (60) The urgency in Sanford's letters increased 
as the Portuguese and English moved toward signing the treaty. "I beg 
leave to say this action of Portugal in exercising acts of sovereignty 
at Banana point [the mouth of the Congo] is bringing this important 
International protection. ..question rapidly to a head." (61) 
His words appealed to Frelinghuysen, who sought to proceed in the 
desired direction, albeit cautiously. In a response marked 
"Confidential," Frelinghuysen wrote, "I can say to you that my own 
judgement is in favor of the recognition of the neutrality of the 
stations along the Congo, and I shall not fail to call the President's 
attention to the subject." "However," he added, "my opinion on this 
subject...if used at all must be used confidentially."(62) 
With this response, Sanford wrote to Frelinghuysen, "I ,^m greatly 
gratified to learn of your intentions— I doubt not the whole country 
will applaud this act of far seeing statesmanship and will profit 
largely by the opening thus assured to our Enterprise and surplus 
manufacturers." To Devaux, he wrote gleefully of his words to 
Frelinghuysen, "There! I think that ought to help keep him up to the 
mark he has been so slow to reach!" (63) 
Thus, by Sanford's November arrival in the U.S., he already had 
Frelinghuysen leaning toward recognition. In a show of support, 
Frelinghuysen, at Sanford's request, sent a U.S. Naval man-of-war to the 
mouth of the Congo.(64) 
With the executive branch firmly inclined toward recognition, 
Leopold now instructed Sanford to test the waters of the legislative 
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branch. "The King is very anxious to hear from you what the 
dispositions of the Senate are," wrote Devaux.(65) Thus Sanford now 
turned his attention to Congress and the private sector. Armed with 
his dossier, Sanford and his wife settled in Washington at the Edward 
Everett mansion on G street. Here, he and his wife embarked on what he 
considered to be one of the most effective methods of diplomacy: 
lobbying through the stomach. At one point, on discussing a diplomatic 
maneuver, Sanford stated, "This cannot be done simply by subsidizing 
certain organs of the press; it can be accomplished mainly over a table 
with good cheer and good liquor upon it and good company around it. I 
have the greatest faith in this as the best of weapons." (66) So famed 
for his methods was Sanford that he was termed "the gastronomic 
diplomat" in a hostile newspaper article entitled "Blue Ribbon 
Sanford." (67) 
Sanford now employed his "gastronomic" methods with a vengence in 
a frenzy of parties and formal suppers during this stay in Washington. 
The letters addressed to him from Latrobe, Morgan and Kasson during 
this period are heavily peppered with profuse gratitude for his 
hospitality and that of his beautiful wife, Gertrude, who Sanford 
utilized to entertain and charm his guests. Latrobe, in several 
letters, referred to the stimulating conversation at Sanford's dinner 
table and thanked him emphatically for a wonderful time. "What a 
charming dinner that was at your home and in such a queenly presence 
too." (68) That sentiment toward Gertrude was echoed with a passion by 
John Kasson who was so mesmerized by Gertrude's beauty that he even 
carried her picture. Kasson had been the beneficiary of Sanford's form 
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of diplomacy for years and in letters tc others wrote lengthy 
descriptions of Sanford's hospitality and Gertrude's beauty. <69) 
In this vein, Sanford turned his attention to the multifarious 
interest groups he wished to influence. The idea of colonization as a 
solution to America's "peculiar interest," as John Latrobe termed the 
the size of America's black population, was one of these peripheral 
interests that Sanford continued to incorporate into this arc of 
diplomacy. 
V. 
During the 1850's and 1860's the idea of the American government 
creating colonies for the resettlement of the freed slaves in Africa 
had been considered by many a feasable solution to the "black problem." 
The fear held by American whites concerning the consequences of freeing 
the slaves was a common social attitude of the period. Envisioning 
that emancipation would mean an eventual mass resettlement of blacks 
in the Northeast, many feared the saturation of the work force by 
blacks and loss of jobs for whites. Others were simply concerned that 
a mass influx of freed slaves, with their "remarkable fecundity" <70) 
would mean the eventual elimination of the white race in America. In 
The North Asiericsn Review, Charles Gardiner, for example, informed the 
reader of "thorough research" that produced data showing the "American 
problem [to be] the most difficult that has confronted a civilized 
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people," and with one exception, "has no parallel in ancient history." 
According to this "research," while the "predominance of white blood 
increases cerebral development...the presence of one—quarter, one—eighth, 
or one-sixteenth produces a brain capacity decidedly inferior to that 
of the pure negro" which the research had already proven to be 
decidedly inferior to the caucasian, according to Gardiner. He thus 
prophesied that "whites would be absorbed by negroes, not negroes by 
whites, and the brain capacity of the mixed race would be less to that 
of the pure negro. Fifty years hence," he predicited, "when negroes 
will surpass whites as three to one, the mongrel race will represent 
brain capacity decidedly inferior to the negro of pure blood." For 
Gardiner, unless something was done, the United States was doomed. (71) 
Moderate Republicans, such as Lincoln, and conservative Republicans 
considered the possibility of returning the freed slaves to their 
homeland and thus eliminating the problem altogether. (72) Before the 
Emancipation Proclamation Lincoln had hoped to gradually free the 
slaves and simultaneously set up colonies for those blacks willing to 
emigrate. These hopes were dashed with the Emancipation Proclamation, 
however: and as the historian, George M. Fredrickson discusses, for 
various reasons, mainly the realization that such a solution would be 
impossibly complicated, and the proposition of colonization as a 
government policy was discounted. Many prominent individuals, however, 
continued to believe that colonization was a valid solution. Two of 
these were Senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama and John Latrobe of 
Maryland, President of the American Colonization Society. 
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The call for colonization had been on the wane in the late 1860's 
and 1870's, due in part to the "half unconscious," (73) macabre belief— 
supported by the racial Darwinian concept of the black race as the 
inferior one that the freed blacks would be unable to adjust to the 
fast paced white world and would soon die out. "Many 
Northerners.. .entered the postwar era with a strong suspicion that the 
blacks would not survive emancipation." (74) Those Americans who 
regarded the black in Darwinist terms saw as inevitable the eventual 
extinction of blacks who sought to succeed as equals in the white 
world. (75) Those who subscribed to this theory believed the census 
reports would prove their theory. But the 1880 census shook many of 
these manipulators of natural selection into a frenzy of doubt. "All 
predictions that the black population would quietly fade were thrown 
into a cocked hat when the census of 1880 appeared to demonstrate that 
the rate of increase of Southern Negroes was substantially greater than 
that of whites(76) Charles Gardiner wrote in 1884, "The census of 
1880 disclosed the fact that...increasing two per cent annually, whites 
will double in every thirty years, while negroes...will double in every 
twenty years(77) 
Their dark hopes dashed, these "prophets of extinction" began 
searching for alternatives. (78) In an article entitled "The African in 
the United States," Professor E.V. Gilliam called vehemently for the 
colonization of American blacks. Arguing that because of the 
"remarkable fecundity of the African," the black population would 
eventually take over the white population, and that the United States 
must protect its racial purity by sending the blacks packing. Gilliam 
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argued that because all tree peoples seek to advance themselves, the 
black population would became increasingly frustrated with inability— 
because of its inferiority—to catch up. "The fact that fusion [of 
blacks and whites] is impossible no one in his senses can deny," he 
wrote, and if the black remained in the U.S. "the advancement of the 
blacks [would become] a menace to the whites. No two free races 
remaining distinctly apart can advance side by side without a struggle 
for supremacy," and eventually the black race, gaining increasing power 
due to its ever enlarging numbers, "will assert that power 
destructively, and bursting forthlike an angry, furious cloud, avenge, in 
tumult and disorder(79) "These are real and gigantic evils gradually 
looming up," he wrote," and they merit the immediate and best attention 
of American statesmen...Colonization, we concieve, is the remedy." He 
further wrote, "we have an impression that a move was made in Congress 
last winter by some Senator, looking to the acquisition of territory in 
Central America as a home for the blacks." (80) 
Certainly one such Senator was John Tyler Morgan who, with the 
persuasion of Henry Shelton Sanford, would, within a year, look toward 
Central Africa as a future repository for the unwanted black Americans. 
Morgan, a devoted white supremacist, had been a member of the Alabama 
secession convention in 1861 and was made brigadier-general in the 
Confederate army. Elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 1876, 
Morgan fought for white supremacy by, for example, ardently opposing 
the Blair education bill for eradicating Southern illiteracy. (81) 
Seemingly responding to those who predicted racial extinction, 
Morgan, writing in 1884, pointed out that the black was developing in 
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both strength and numbers. "The negro is a physically strong man," he 
wrote, "in his native land...his stature is good, and his muscular 
development.. .is sinewy, tense and powerful. In America, he has gained 
greater height...ease and smoothness of movement...nothing in the census 
reports indicates that the negro race in the United States will not 
increase in numbers." Their "power and importance" would grow in the 
United States, he predicted, but "in this country, this growth will 
avail but little for their advantage. Here they have to encounter 
personal, individual competition with the white man." And their 
successes would be dimmed by the jealousy of their "caste." Thus, he 
prophesied, "race-prejudice will forever remain as an incubus on all 
their individual or aggregated efforts." (82) 
The solution, Morgan believed, was colonization. And the best place 
for colonization, for Morgan, was "a land that has been under the seal 
of darkness until now:" Central Africa. Here, he wrote, "we seem to 
discover the natural theater for negro development, and welcome it as a 
door opened by the hand of Providence to the Africans who have gained 
the powers incident to Christian civilization while in bondage, and are 
now prepared to enter upon their inheritance with the assurance of 
success."(83) "The Free States of the Congo," said Morgan, was the 
American black's "first real opportunity to prove himself worthy of the 
liberties and civilization which he has been endowed." (84) 
This theme, that the great benefits that the American black had 
reaped while in the United States could be exported to Africa with 
him, and thus serve to "civilize" his African relatives, was underscored 
by John Latrobe. Latrobe, whose presidency of the American 
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CoIonization Society spanned from 1853, when he succeeded Henry Clay, 
until his death in 1891, was a very active member of the organization. 
He developed the first map of Liberia and devoted much time to helping 
found the colony of Maryland at Cape Palmas which later became a 
county of Liberia. The Maryland Colonization Society—organizers of 
the Maryland colony—had been created in 1831, in reaction to the Nat 
Turner rebellion. This society reflected more of the aversion to the 
freed blacks than did the American Colonization society and actually 
tried to pass laws to forcibly deport blacks from America. Since 
Liberia's independence in 1847, the American Colonization Society had 
increasingly became more of an emigration society, helping blacks to 
leave the United States. (85) 
As a founder of the Maryland Colonization Society and president of 
both the American Colonization Society and the American branch of the 
AIA, Latrobe was perhaps the most actively involved of any American 
in colonizing the American black population in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
For Latrobe, the United States had a "peculiar interest" in the 
opening of Central Africa. That peculiar interest was the size of its 
American black population. Sanford, understanding Latrobe *s beliefs, 
used this attitude to its full advantage. Writing to Latrobe in 1877, 
Sanford emphasized that he believed it was the role of American blacks 
to civilize Africa. 
"Near 5,000,000 of our people are of African race—descendants of 
slaves; contact with the white races and lately emancipation, 
education, and equality of political rights have made them by 
far superiors of the parent race and will tend to excite a spirit 
of enterprise, ambitions and desires for which central Africa opens 
a wide, peculiarly appropriate field. Physically they are better 
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adapted than the whiter to itss climate and to undergo fatigues...[it 
is a topic] well worthy the attention of our citizens and our 
philanthropic spirit." (86) 
Latrobe responded, 
"I cordially [agree] to all you say of the peculiar interest that we, 
in the United States, have in the exploration of Africa. For 
more than half a century now, I have been advocating 
the idea that Africa isto be civilized, not by occasional 
efforts, here and there, of enthusiastic travellers, 
or devoted white missionaries, but by -he emigration at their 
own cost, of the colored people of the United States to that 
continent<87) 
Sanford seems to have believed that a helpful tactic would be to 
parade blacks eager to emigrate and requested that Latrobe find blacks 
who would publicly attest to a desire to help settle the Congo. 
Interestingly, Latrobe greeted this request with little enthusiasm, and 
responded, 
"I have your note of yesterday. In the first place, my extremely 
intelligent colored porter tells me there are no leading men 
among them here, and if there were, I am afraid, their advocacy 
of any proper connecton with Africa would tend to diminish if not 
destroy their popularity. The better sort of the race in Baltimore 
are too comfortable, too much respected...to take any interest in 
Africa or anything African.. .nothing can be done in this quarter<88) 
A tactic that Latrobe and Sanford agreed upon was to emphasize 
Liberia as an historical precedent for the recognition of the AIA as 
the sovereign power in the Congo. Like the Association, the American 
Colonization Society was a private organization that privately colonized 
Liberia. The Association hoped to use this precedent in order to 
achieve a similar recognition of the Congo Free State. Latrobe 
provided historical sketches and documents from the Colonization 
Society pertaining to the recognition of Liberia by the United States. 
83 
Describing the origins of Liberia as "the work of a benevolent 
association gradually developing into a nation whose flag is recognized 
everywhere, and with which all the civilized nations of the world have 
treaties," Latrobe believed that there was "no better precedent to be 
found anywhere for the establishment of colonies on the Congo under a 
common head.,.with a recognized flag just as the American Colonization 
Society was the representation in the United States of the infant 
settlement on the S.W. coast of Africa." (89) 
Although confused, like most, over the identity of the Association, 
("What, in good plain English, do the words, 'Comite d'Etudes du Haut 
Congo' mean?" he would write to Sanford) he acted as a learned envoy, 
responding to "unlearned questioners" who desired more information on 
the Congo project, (90) He committed to write to U.S. Senators who he 
knew personally "as soon as there is a resolution to be voted 
upon I...do not think they will have any trouble voting for it," he 
predicted. (91) In addition, Latrobe repeatedly offered the quarters 
of the Colonization Society as an office for Sanford if he needed it 
while staying in Washington. He saw Sanford as, "the most efficient 
emmisary [sic]," (92) and on the U.S.recognition of the AIA, in 
April, 1884, congratulated Sanford on "your very great success in this 
whole affair. Mr. Webster once said to me that Results afforded the 
true standard by which to measure men—you have illustrated the 
application of this rule." (93) 
So inspired was Latrobe by the Congo project, "and the notice taken 
of my agency in connection with Liberia," he wrote a paper tor the 
Maryland Historical Society on the origins and history of Liberia, in 
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which he discussed Sanford's work. <94) Referring to the Congo project 
as the "noblest work that prince or potentate has had a hand in for 
centuries,"<95) Latrobe remained an ardent supporter of Sanford's 
efforts. 
VI . 
As discussed by Milton Plesur, with American industrial expansion 
in the 1880's came a perception of overproduction and a need to search 
for markets. Coupled with this desire for economic expansion was a 
concern for American prestige in the world community. Thus, the years 
preceding the Spanish American war represented an "incubation period" 
of America's impending empire. "The new departure had its roots in the 
quiet years of the gilded age." <96) One American who reflected these 
views was John A. Kasson. 
There has surfaced no evidence that John Kasson had any influence 
on the recognition of the Association. However, when Stanley emerged 
from his successful exploration along the Congo river in 1877, Kasson 
responded enthusiastically to Stanley's reports of rich commercial 
prospects in the region. As Minister to Austria, he wrote home of the 
great interest the Austrians displayed in the commercial prospects 
reported by Stanley and complained about the American government's 
refusal in its foreign policy to live up to the drive and energy of 
citizens such as Stanley. Moreover, as his biographer states, "Feeling 
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as he did about expansion, Kasson naturally approved recognition of 
Leopold's stations." <97) When the King of the Belgians request that 
Kasson help, as Minister to Germany, to attain German recognition of 
the future Free State, Kasson heartily complied. <98) 
John Kasson, through the post-war era, had gradually evolved into 
an ardent economic expansionist and a spokesman for the American 
businessman. Kasson believed American expansion of foreign trade was 
crucial to American economic well being and became increasingly 
frustrated by what he observed as the feckless American isolationism. 
How much longer," he asked, 
is our unobservant Congress to shut its eyes to the sagacious 
extension of the commercial lines and positions of foreign 
countries? How much longer are we to continue blind to the 
demands for new markets for our already excessive and rapidly 
increasing production? How much longer fail to seize opportunities 
for the wider distribution of our manufactures?<99) 
Kasson's ideas for a new American foreign policy agenda included 
expansion of the Monroe Doctrine and acquisition of overseas territory. 
As Minister to Austria from 1877 to 1881, Kasson observed the 
pervasive imperialistic energy in Europe and felt that U.S. was being 
left behind. <100) When he returned home in 1881, he wrote two articles 
in the North American Review beseeching the American public to "implore 
Congress and the Executive to release themselves, in part, from interior 
political struggles, and to remember that it is the duty of 
statesmanship to anticipate the future." <101) 
For Kasson, the refusal of the U.S. to "plant" its money into 
opening overseas markets would cause the American agricultural and 
manufacturing surplus to "roll back from the Atlantic coast upon the 
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interior," and the "wheels of prosperity" would be "clogged by the very 
richness of the burden which they carry, but cannot deliver." 
Refraining from acquiring outlying possessions, for Kasson, was "at 
this stage of our history, simply imbicile." <102) 
Thus, in the case of the Congo, as his biographer states, "He would 
seize any and every opportunity to further the interest of the 
Association, whose interest," Kasson believed, "was also the American 
interest." <103) Although in 1881 his expansionist vision was focussed 
on South America, when the Congo issue arose, Kasson would fight for, 
and ardently defend, American participation. By recognizing the AIA 
and participating in the Berlin Conference, Kasson stated, "we gain 
everything which we could gain by owning the country [the Congo], 
except the expense of governing it ."<104) 
As already discussed, Senator Morgan remained convinced that the 
solution to the "negro problem" lay in the colonization of Africa by 
black American emigrees. <105) In addition, Morgan, like Kasson, was an 
ardent economic expansionist who introduced and supported much of the 
expansionist legislation proposed in the Senate. <He was the "foremost 
advocate" of a Central American canal, always discussing it in terms of 
economic benefits for the U.S. He also advocated annexing Cuba, and 
bringing in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Hawaii as states.) <106) Moreover, he 
is cited by one historian as having viewed the "Conga's throngs af 
unclad natives" as seeming "to offer an unlimited market" for southern 
textiles.<107) 
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Thus, Sanford appealed to Morgan with two compelling arguments 
and, by January 1884, had successfully interested the Senator in the 
Congo region. "I am reading up on Congo and the attitudes of Portugal," 
he wrote Sanford. (108) Morgan, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations in the Senate, held considerable power over American foreign 
policy issues. By February, 1884, Sanford had Morgan wielding his 
power for the recognition of the Association. Morgan wrote to the 
Secretary of State, asking him to look into the Anglo-Portuguese treaty 
and inform Morgan on the direction that Frelinghuysen wished Congress 
to take. "As I wish to aid and not retard any movement that will give 
us footing there," he wrote Sanford, "I am reluctant to do anything in 
the absence of information as to the policy of the 
administration." (109) However, without this concrete evidence, Morgan 
was still convinced that England's motives for the Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty were antithetical to American interests. "No one should mistake 
the policy of England in such matters," he wrote, "It is historical and 
unchanging. The English will always find the way to their interests 
whatever it may cost in anything but money. So they will agree quickly 
with Portugal that through that power, they may increase their traffic 
with Congo and monopolize its trade." (110) Thus, Morgan displayed an 
eagerness for the project before he had even received the information 
he needed in order to commit himself to attaining U.S. recognition of 
the Association. 
Further building on his expansionist lobby, Sanford turned his 
attention toward the American business community. Sanford directed 
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this tactic toward the powerful New York Chamber of Commerce, using 
the influence of his friend Judge Charles P. Daly, president of the 
American Geographical society and organizer of the original American 
national committee of the AIA in 1877.(111) Daly firmly believed that 
the U.S. should recognize the Association. (112) Upon Sanford's arrival, 
Daly placed himself at the service of Sanford. Before Arthur delivered 
his message on December 4, Daly, probably at the request of Sanford, 
wrote the president and informed him of his views. "I said nothing 
about your visit," he wrote Sanford, "but only about my own views of 
the necessity of immediate action and what action should be taken—the 
official recognition of the Association by our government." Thus, 
seemingly without the instigation of Leopold's agent, influential 
citizens were now calling on Arthur to recognize the Association. 
Believing that the President's Message was "all that is necessary to 
begin the movement," Daly pledged to continue his pressure and "follow 
it up here," in New York. (113) 
He was true to his word. On January 2, the New York Times 
predicted that as "the Commercial interests involved are so important, 
that the influence of Commercial bodies in this country may properly be 
expected and action will probably be soon taken by the Chamber of 
Commerce in this city."(114) Eight days later, through Daly, Sanford 
was able to convince the Chamber to issue two resolutions on January 
10, 1884. Introduced by A.A. Low, the first resolution condemned 
Portugal's efforts to gain sovereignty over the mouth of the Congo, 
while the second resolution called on the United States to recognize 
the Association's sovereignty in the region. (115) The resolution read. 
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Resolved that the recognition by the Government of the United States 
of the flag of the International African Association now extending 
over twenty-two settlements, in the heart of Africa, will be but 
an acknowledgement of the fact that that organization, under rights 
ceded to it by African chiefs of independent territories, is 
exercising rule and authority over a large part of Africa...and that 
it be recommended to the President to send an accredited agent 
of the Government to the Congo, to confer with that Association 
on the adopting of such measures, as may secure 
to American citizens 
free commercial intercourse along the course of that river and 
through the various settlements or stations established by the 
Association." (116) 
Both resolutions were passed unanimously. The following day, the 
New York Times reported the resolutions and commented in a lengthy 
editorial that they "should receive prompt attention of the Federal 
Government." In glowing terms the editorial predicted the Congo region 
to be "the source of enormous trade" and expressed the belief that 
"United States can rightly lend its most active and earnest co­
operation" to "the establishment of absolute neutrality in such a region 
and its opening to the commerce and peaceful enterprise of all 
nations."(117) At Leopold's expense, the resolutions were printed and 
delivered to influential people such as congressmen and members of 
chambers of commerce around the country. (118) 
In addition, Sanford transmitted the resolutions to Morgan which 
were clearly helpful to him in the Senate, where he could refer to them 
as evidence of a desire among American business interests for the U.S. 
to play a greater role in securing new markets, "I have Major Low's 
resolutions [resolutions of the New York Chamber of Commerce] and will 
be glad to have his speech if he wrote one," wrote Morgan to 
Sanford. (119) From Latrobe, Sanford gleaned the details of the creation 
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Ql Llc^ria and ^snt '.nsiii to Xcrgan. > Morgan used Latrobe's 
information in his report to the Senate. 
VII . 
The Alabama Senator, through January and February of 1884, 
corresponded with Frelinghuysen, gradually learning more and more about 
the Congo and the Association. By March, Frelinghuysen had accepted 
all of Sanford's arguments and had become convinced of the viability of 
the AIA and the need to recognize its claims in Central Africa. 
Frelinghuysen wrote Morgan on March 13, that "the protection of life 
and property of our citizens requires that something should be done." 
Using almost the identical wording of Sanford, Frelinghuysen 
demonstrated the degree to which Sanford had influenced the Secretary 
of State. Frelinghuysen wrote Morgan that the Portuguese claims could 
not be allowed to extend to the Upper Congo where, "discovered by an 
American and opened to the world and to civilization by the African 
International Association...to this region, free access both by land and 
water, should be secured to our citizens and trade." In one sentence, 
Frelinghuysen's words exemplified Sanford's skill 
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at persuading others to accept his statements as the truth. Not only had 
Sanford managed to keep Frelinghuysen convinced that the AIA was the 
"Association" that the U.S. was being asked to recognize, without any 
question of the Comite or the AIC coming into the picture, but also 
Frelinghuysen demonstrated his conviction that Stanley's adopted 
nationality as an American played an important role in the issue. (121) 
Frelinghuysen continued to describe the AIA exactly as Sanford had 
explained it to him. Rather than describing the current Belgian based 
AIC (the actual "Association" that Leopold wanted recognized) 
Frelinghuysen described the AIA, detailing even the Executive Committee, 
with its three representatives of the "English-speaking, Germanic, and 
Latin races." (122) No mention was made of the fact that the last meeting 
of the AIA was in 1877 or that Belgian national committee of AIA had 
became a separate unit and had been renamed the "Comite D,Etudes Du Haut 
Congo." 
There was, in addition, no mention that this committee and the French 
national committee of the AIA had been competing for territory for the 
past five years, or that the Comite had been disbanded in 1878 and the 
International Association of the Congo subsequently created, an 
organization completely devoid of the "International" aspect, except in 
name, and completely under the control of Leopold II. Frelinghuysen 
demonstrated no hint of such alterations. "The African International 
Association," he wrote, 
has for its sole object, the development of the vast, fertile and 
populous regions of Central Africa, by a chain of posts or stations 
under its flag, which shall give hospitality and aid to all comers 
traders, or missionaries, or others. (123) 
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The government's attention had been called to the situation in the Congo 
because, he continued, a neutral association was "in the interests of our 
citizens seeking trade with that vast and fertile region, and [was] an 
outlet for the overproduction of our manufactures," and also was "a 
practical means of striking at the roots of the slave trade." The way to 
assure "protection to our citizens in their legitimate enterprises," for 
Frelinghuysen, was the "recognition, as a friendly flag, of the flag of 
the International Association which floats over these stations as a sign 
of protection and of civilization around it, and the appointment of an 
Agent of the Government to reside there." (124) In return for simple 
recognition of the Association's claims in the region, the Association 
would allow the importation of American goods into the region, duty free, 
and would assure the rights of any American to "hold property and to 
exercise every legitimate pursuit." In short, any American would be 
treated as a citizen,(125) 
For the United States, the offer by Leopold to allow the U.S. to share 
in all of the economic benefits of controlling an area without the 
complications of political control should have appeared to be too good to 
believe. But there is no hint of any such suspicions in any of 
Frelinghuysen's words. Frelinghuysen, his words further attesting to 
Sanford's skills, went on to inform Morgan of the precedents that 
justified a private organization assuming political control in a region, 
Liberia being the most notable. "Liberia," he wrote, "like the States of 
the Congo, was founded by private citizens united in a philanthropic 
association and it derived no authority from the Government." Thus, 
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Frelinghuysen reasoned that because the territory controlled bv the 
Association had been ceded to it by tribal chiefs in seventy-nine 
treaties, that the State Department could not "but admit" that the 
territorial rights of those "native princes...appear to have been duly 
ceded to the International Association." <126) Such being the case, 
Frelinghuysen saw no reason "why the United States may not recognize 
such sovereign powers, and thereby secure protection for the legitimate 
enterprises of our citizens," and neither did Morgan. With both the 
Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in their corner, it was cnly a matter of time before Leopold 
and his agents succeeded in their goal. 
VII I .  
In all of their instructions and correspondence to Sanford, Leopold and 
his secretary, Devaux, expressed continual and profuse gratitude and 
satisfaction. After the President's message Devaux wrote, "The King 
wishes me to say that nothing could be better than what the President 
said in his message H.M. is a thousand times obliged to you for 
having obtained it." <127) "What you say and do is perfection and I am 
commanded to express the King's gratitude," Devaux wrote in one 
letter. <128) After the resolution by the New York Chamber of Commerce 
was issued, Devaux wrote to Sanford, "I got your letter of Jan y 17 and 
have no end of thanks to convey to you from the King. You are doing 
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things in such a way that instructions are completely useless says 
H.M.(129) In another letter he wrote "I have yours from 27 Feb. You 
have done wonders. The King wants me to say that nothing can be better 
and also how very thankful he feels for your valuable efforts." (130) 
In the meantime, Leopold, through Devaux, sent updates of Stanley's 
and De Brazza's progress in the Congo, and extensive advice and 
information for Sanford to employ in his arguments. 
The urgency to obtain American recognition increased as England and 
Portugal moved closer toward signing their treaty. In February, Devaux 
complained bitterly to Sanford that the Anglo-Portuguese treaty "is the 
death of all commerce in Central Africa." Although, as the treaty now 
stood, England would have access to trade along the Congo River by water, 
the treaty made no mention of movement by land. Devaux noted that land 
travel was crucial to transit along the river Remarking that the 
"English have been taken in like babies," Devaux underscored the grave 
necessity of securing America's recognition. "Our only hope is that the 
U.S. will protest energetically." (131) Finally, on February 24, 1864, the 
British signed the treaty, hence recognizing Portuguese sovereignty at the 
mouth of the Congo. Leopold needed the dual influences of American 
recognition and general international outrage at the pretensions of the 
Anglo-Portugese Treaty, in order to prevent the ruin of his dream. 
Although the treaty still needed to be ratified by the British Parliament 
and the European powers, Leopold needed to gain prompt American 
recognition.(132) 
On the same day as the signing of the treaty, Morgan sent Sanford the 
rough draft of the resolution he was preparing to offer in the Senate the 
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following day. Requesting advice and criticism, Morgan wrote Sanford. "If 
I should offer something like this in the Senate tomorrow, it will at 
least give us a point of inquiry to be specifically addressed to the 
Secretary of State by the Committee in confidence and will develop an 
outline of policy." <133) Morgan then sent the draft on to Latrobe for 
further advice.<134) 
The following day, Morgan introduced a joint resolution in the Senate, 
"Declaring the lawfulness of the occupation of the country drained by the 
Congo River and its tributaries by the African International 
Association...and to recognize its flag, and to appropriate money to carry 
this resolution into effect." It stated that the rights and privileges 
obtained by the African International Association, "entitle its flag, as 
the symbol thereof, to the recognition and respect of other countries as 
the flag of the Free States of the Congo." <135) Interestingly, the 
following day, because MI have been requested," Morgan introduced a 
second resolution that merely called for the President to take "such 
measures as may be necessary to assure protection to our citizens and 
their trade in the territories called the Free States of the Congo." <136) 
Both resolutions were sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations for 
study. There the resolutions sat little touched until the Committee 
concluded deliberations over the Mexican Treaty. In the meantime, both 
Sanford and Latrobe continued to collect data for Morgan to use in the 
Committee. "Won't you get up the instances in our history of the treaties 
made by those who came to America as private people, not under charters, 
and made treaties with the Indians. In such cases, all that has been 
done in Congo is fully justified both as to the right of the tribes...and 
also of the immigrants," Morgan requested. (137) 
Finally, the Committee began examining the material and by March 22, 
had completed its report. Morgan sent the report to Sanford asking that 
it be kept confidential until he delivered it to the Senate. (138) 
Although the attitude toward the resolutions were "excellent," as Morgan 
said, the Committee asked numerous questions about every aspect of the 
Association and Morgan found himself devoid of much of the pertinent 
information. Morgan asked Sanford for such documents as a declaration of 
the Association or an official statement of the "objects and purposes" of 
the International Association and furthermore warned Sanford against 
"anything that can't be fully explained." (139) 
Sanford, in turn, apparently demanded of both Daly and Latrobe 
documentation that Sanford may once have sent to the Geographical Society 
in the 1870's. In several letters both responded, almost defensively, to 
Sanford's requests, saying that they had no such documents nor could they 
remember ever having seen the sought after papers. The question arises 
whether Sanford knew that he had never sent the documents and was 
merely, by requesting the documentation from Daly and Latrobe, seeking to 
cover his tracks.(140) 
Certainly Sanford played the dissembler in the letter that Morgan 
finally received, dated March 24. Sanford shamelessly proceeded to give 
the history of the AIA without any mention of the AIC and describing the 
Camite D'Etudes as a branch of the AIA. 
This work, which the King of the Belgians has taken under his especial 
personal and financial protection, has developed to extraordinary 
proportions, and has had for practical result the opening-up to 
civilizing influences and to the world's traffic this vast, populous, 
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and fertile region, and securing certain destruction to the slave 
trade wherever its flag floats." (141) 
As undocumented and flagrantly incorrect as the letter was it was 
accepted by the Committee as sufficient documentation of the 
"Association's" background and purposes. On March 26, Morgan presented 
the Committee's report to the Senate. This exhaustive document was 
heavily peppered with Sanford's touch. Morgan stated in his report, at 
one point, that the opening of the Congo by the AIA "opens to civilization 
the valley of the Congo, with its 900,000 square miles of fertile 
territory and its 50,000,000 of people, who are soon to become most 
useful factors in the increase of the productions of the earth and the 
swelling volume of commerce." (142> John Latrobe, on reading the report, 
also noted Sanford's presence in Morgan's words, telling Sanford, "I have 
Senator Morgan's report which I take for granted you had a good deal to 
do with, with many thanks." (143) 
In the report, one can see all of Sanford's efforts come to fruition. 
Morgan set out point by point every one of Sanford's tactics. He 
emphasized the Congo river as having been discovered by an American. He 
asserted Liberia and the colonization of the U.S. as "civil power exerted 
by commercial associations" as binding precedents. (144) He, moreover, 
termed the recognition of the Free State as a "duty to our African 
population" as "we should endeavor to secure them the right to freely 
return to their fatherland." Thus, Morgan simpered, if black Americans 
desired, they could have a place to go "as individuals or as associated 
colonists looking to their reestablishment in their own country."(145) 
And he continually celebrated the Association's main goal, according to 
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Morgan, "of the civilization of the negro population of Africa, by opening 
up their country to free commercial relations with foreign countries." 
For the Senator from Alabama, it was the philanthropic duty of the U.S. 
to help these "civilizing forces" in Africa and recognize the 
"International African Association." 
Most exhaustively, however, Morgan focused on the commercial promise 
in the Congo and the great market potential for American surplus goods. 
Unless the United States recognized the Association's claims, future 
trading in the region by the U.S. would be in jeopardy. The Portuguese 
pretensions were invalid and dangerous to American freedom of trade in 
the region and must be blocked. The Congo "could not therefore be placed 
under the shelter of any single foreign flag," and Morgan emphasized the 
AIA as not an organization from one nation but "composed of persons from 
various countries." (.146> The recognition of its claims would be the 
recognition of freedom for all foreign countries to trade in the region. 
The language in Morgan's report was profoundly paternalistic and 
racist. He blithely promised that the people of the Congo region had 
happily submitted to the "banner" of the Association, recognizing and 
submitting to it as a "symbol...that promised them good will and 
security."(147) He furthermore assured the Senate, and no doubt believed, 
that the Association was not "a new and usurping sovereignty seeking to 
destroy existing governments," but was "a common agent for the common 
welfare." He then, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
recommended the recognition as "a proper means of carrying into effect a 
policy concerning the Free States of the Congo." (148) 
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Support came from many sectors around the country as Morgan's 
resolutions were being deliberated in the Senate. Latrobe wrote to the 
two Maryland Senators, requesting that they vote for the resolution. (149 > 
Certainly Sanford's other supporters, whether members of chambers of 
commerce around the country, white supremacists, or expansionists, were 
similarly following suit. Since late December, 1883 and January, 1884 the 
New York Herald and New York Times had printed editorials supporting the 
recognition of the Free State. (150) Referring to the President's message 
in 1883, and noting the president's words that it "may become advisable 
for us to cooperate," the New York Times editorial stated, "It not only 
may, but it has already become advisable and imperative that we should 
move on this matter." The same editorial emphasized Stanley as an 
American and predicted that the Congo region would one day be "as 
populous wealthy and powerful as the United States." (151) James Bennett 
of the New York Herald, who had commissioned Stanley's 1874-1877 journey 
into the Congo, remained an ardent supporter of the Association's efforts 
and thus gladly printed supportive articles in the newspaper. Sanford 
even wrote an accompanying piece at Bennett's request printed with a 
Herald article in December ,1883. (152) 
All of these efforts proved successful; on April 10, 1884, the Senate 
passed the resolution. "It is the opinion of the Senate that the flag of 
the African International Association should be recognized as the flag ol 
a friendly Government." (153) Sanford's "Washington Campaign" was 
victorious. 
Although an injunction of secrecy was placed on the resolution, 
Sanford still telegraphed in code to Brussells. Strauch immediately 
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responded with the coded message, "Georges enchante vous ecrit. William" 
Devaux wrote, "Hurrah! old fellow! Well done by jove!"(154) 
Once Congress extended its recommendation, Frelinghuysen readily 
agreed to recognize Leopold's organization. (155) On April 22, 1884 
Frelinguysen and Henry Sanford, as representative of the "International 
African Association", exchanged declarations. In both declarations, the 
titles International African Association, and the International 
Association of the Congo were used interchangeably without question by 
the United States. This fact, however, was apparently inconsequential. 
The U.S. government announced its approval of "the humane and benevolent 
purposes of the International Association of the Congo administering, as 
it does, the interests of the Free States there established." It then 
pledged to "order the officers of the United States, both on land and sea, 
to recognize the flag of the International African Association as the flag 
of a friendly Government." (156) The AIC was officially recognized and 
the future "Independent State of the Congo" finally formally accepted by 
at least one nation as a legitimate entity. 
IX. 
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Leopold. s=till wanted more of Sanford. The Angle-Portuguese treaty 
remained a grave threat to the Association. Devaux wrote, "I think that 
if the U.S. could work the English a little, they might prevent the 
ratif ication of the Anglo-Port, treaty. Lots of M.P. are against it." (157) 
However, Leopold's vision of a successive reaction once one nation had 
recognized the Congo Free State soon proved accurate. As one historian 
states, "By recognizing his private association as a sovereign power the 
American Government gave real existence to this previously very 
precariously placed body and thus enormously strengthened Leopold's 
international position." (158) 
Almost immediately, on April 23, France followed the example of the 
U.S. and recognized the Association. The degree to which American 
recognition influenced the French is a point of dispute. While one 
historian assumes American recognition helped stimulate the French 
action, (159) another believes that, despite Leopold's hopes, America's 
initiative had little initial effect over European policy.(160) 
Certainly the key motivating factor for France was the Anglo-
Portuguese treaty, which, although not ratified, posed an increasing 
threat to French hopes for the region. France, moreover, assumed that 
Leopold's state would eventually fail. Believing that it was outwitting 
Leopold and the other European powers, France recognized the AIA on the 
condition that France would receive first bid should the Free State 
decide to sell its possessions. (161) The acceptance of such a clause by 
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Leopold is seen as a "masterstroke" by one historian. (162) This put 
France in an apparently powerful position in the eyes of other nations. 
Germany and England hence became wary of French pretensions. Thus, the 
three powers, rather than regarding Leopold with apprehension, allowed 
the king to play the nations against each other. As a result, all of the 
interested powers came to look at the small unassuming state of Belgium 
as the least of the possible evils in Central Africa. A "Free State," set 
up merely to ensure the free trade in the region by all nations, appeared 
a better solution than France, Germany, Portugal or Britain obtaining sole 
control.(163) 
Although Bismarck had many questions about the AIA and AIC, 
questions that the U.S. should have asked, he was more incensed by the 
combined British offenses of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty and the Angra 
Pequena affair. (164) Hence, at the end of April, the German Chancellor 
began studying the terms of the United States recognition of the 
AIC. (165) He found much to be suspicious about and in no way accepted 
Leopold's feigned philanthropic concern over the slave trade. (166) While 
the U.S. had accepted Leopold's vague descriptions of what exactly his 
state sought to consist of, Bismark demanded specificity, and Leopold 
gave it to him. Bismark was shocked when Leopold informed him of his 
claim on much of Central Africa. (167) At the same time, however, 
Bismarck was now in the process of "cementing" a Franco-German entente, 
and with the French in the position to buy the land that it was assumed 
Leopold would eventually sell, Bismarck saw no reason to deny the King 
what he wanted and thus recognized Leopold's claims on November, 
0,1884.(168) 
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Vith three countries having recognized the Association, The 
State of the Congo was now a powerful force. In the meantime, it became 
increasingly apparent that the powers should meet to discuss Vest Africa 
Bismark took the initiative, and thus control over the plans for th° 
Conference.(169) 
X. 
The Conference was scheduled to meet in Berlin in November, 1384. 
The U.S., along with thirteen other countries, was invited. Frelinghuysen 
was hesitant to appoint a delegate, fearing that participation would 
appear out of step with the United State's policy of non-interference. 
Largely due to Kasson's assurances that no word in the Conference 
objectives related to political or territorial arrangements and that no 
government was bound to adhere to the Conference resolutions, 
Frelinghuysen acquiesed. Since the foreign ministers to Germany were 
generally the appointed delegates to the Conference, it required no 
special effort or added expense to allow a U.S. representative to attend. 
Moreover,, in appointing Kasson, the Secretary of State confined Kasson 
to discussiong economic and humanitarian interests, with strict 
instructions against participating in any hint of land acquisition. (170) 
Earlier, on the way to begin his post as Minister to Germany, Kasson 
had stopped in Brussels, had an audience with the King, and spent an 
evening at Gingelom with his old friend Henry Sanford. Upon Kasson's 
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appointment as delegate to the Berlin Conference, Sanford sent him 
congratulations and urged him to oppose Portugal's claims. Allowing the 
Association power over the Congo's mouth, he added, "would be a matter of 
pride to us Americans." <171) When Kasson learned in Berlin that he could 
have an associate delegate to the Conference, the obvious choice, after 
his visit to Brussels, was Henry Sanford.<172) Leopold seems to have had 
similar ideas, since no representation of the AIC was allowed at the 
Conference.<173) 
Sanford might have even written to Kasson offering his assistance at 
the Conference, because, when Kasson wrote him in October asking that 
Sanford attend, he stated, "I hasten to acknowledge your note of the 
nineteenth You might be very useful here during the 'Conference.'" <174) 
On the other hand however, the tone in Kasson's request suggests that 
Sanford had seemed hesitant about the idea. Sanford must have told Kasson 
that he. needed to return to the States to vote because the next day 
Kasson wrote Sanford "You would do more good [at the Conference] than to 
go home and vote. Your council would be most useful. Think of it." <175) 
After convincing Sanford to attend the Conference with him, Kasson 
telegraphed Frelinghuysen his request for Sanford as associate delegate 
and October 24 reported to Sanford that he was "authorized to request 
your association without provision for compensation." <176) Thus, because 
of Kasson's request, Leopold now had a representative of the AIC at the 
Conference. 
Stanley was also included as the "American citizen...discoverer, 
traveller, and expert" also without pay, as Frelinghuysen was having 
difficulty funding his expanding foreign policy initiatives. <177) 
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There was some controversy over Kasson's invitation to Stanley. 
Stanley still harbored ideas of Britain establishing a protectorate over 
the area in question. Thus Leopold had become increasingly frustrated 
with the explorer. The last thing Leopold needed at the conference was 
someone, still in his employ, representing Britain's interests. (.178) 
Kasson believed that "we have a perfect right to offer an American 
citizen...as witness to facts existing in the Congo countryparticularly 
since De Brazza would be in attendance with France. (179) 
Kasson prevailed, and Stanley attended as an advisor, although he was 
given strict instructions to comply with Sanford's instructions. (180) 
Moreover, Stanley left Berlin and returned to London early in the 
Conference's proceedings, where he remained, sending Sanford updates on 
the developing British sentiment toward the Association. Writing Sanford 
on December 4, he asked Sanford to telegraph, "if my presence is needed 
in Berlin, because if it is not necessary it is of no use for me to go — I 
have received great welcome since my return here though the papers are 
rather severe on you."(181) At the same time Sanford clearly displayed 
doubt of Stanley's loyalty to Leopold because Stanley wrote him 
defensively in January 1885 that "I have given you my word that 'I am out 
of it' unless I am asked to." (182) 
With Sanford and Stanley as advisors to Kasson and also as agents to 
Leopold, clearly not only the United States, but also the AIC, was 
represented by the American delegation. In addition, Bismarck had become 
convinced that Germany would maintain greater freedom in a Congo 
controlled by the AIC under King Leopold than under any other European 
power and thus became the champion of the Association during the 
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Conference. As one historian notes, "It did not seem to Bismarck to 
matter much whether an eccentric European monarch was able or not to 
indulge in his fancies in tropical Africa. For once the chancellor was 
wrong." <183) 
In the next four months, the foundation for the future of black 
Africa was settled among the Europeans. Although the Conference was 
comprised of ten full sessions, between November 15, 1884, and February 
26, 1885, the actual work was accomplished by the committees set up 
between the sessions. <184) The resulting "General Act," signed by all of 
the delegates and eventually ratified by all of the attending countries 
except the United States, dealt with the establishment of free trade in 
the mouth and basin of the Congo region, the freedom of navigation on the 
Congo and Niger rivers, and the setting up of "protectorates." All of 
this was accomplished by the end of January, 1885. <185) However, the 
Conference continued for another month in order to determine who would 
control the Congo region. <186) 
The negotiations over the territorial settlement of the Congo were not 
part of the conference proceedings per se. France had required, as a 
requisite for attending the Conference, that this issue be left out of 
the Conference goals. <187) Thus, the fate of the Congo was actually 
decided in separate treaties. The key to the attainment of Leopold's 
goals lay in the recognition by the rest of the powers of the Association 
as a legitimate political entity in the Congo. Great Britain officially 
recognized the AIC on Dec,16, 1884, and thereafter the rest of the powers, 
with the exception of Turkey, followed suit. Belgium was the last country 
during the Conference to officially recognize the AIC as a sovereign 
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state. *.188) Simultaneously, in February, France and Portugal concluded 
territorial treaties with, the AIC. (189) The powers weary of Portugal's 
"erratic" methods of diplomacy, pressured it to relenquish the right bank 
of the Congo mouth containing Banana point. Portugal conceded and the 
new State had its outlet to the sea.(190) These recognition and 
territorial treaties, though not part of the General Act, were 
nevertheless drawn together with the Conference protocols. Thus, the 
Congo Free State, by February 26, 1885 had enough authority to sign the 
General Act of the Berlin West African Conference with the rest of the 
powers.(191) 
Kasson, forced to constrain his participation to non-territorial 
issues, had little say in the significant decisions of the Conference. 
His performance has been described by one historian as "distinguished by 
more verbosity than brains," (192) her conclusion being that the United 
States role in the Conference was "of no practical importance."(193) 
Similarly, another historian terms Kasson "totally incompetent." 
However, his biographer emphasizes that his retraint was due to American 
attitudes and his specific instructions.(194) 
10.: 
XI . 
The key act by the United States had been the recognition of the AIC 
as a "friendly flag" in the Congo. Germany and England, before 
recognizing the AIC, carefully studied the American precedent. (195 > It was 
recognition of the AIC that put the United States into the European arena, 
concerning Africa, and cinched its invitation to the Conference. 
Interestingly, when Sanford had first written to Frelinghuysen on the 
subject in December 1882, he had revealed his strategy—and thus 
Leopold's—that if the U.S. would recognize the Association, "it could be 
assured, Great Britain has given too many examples in this way" that it 
would "receive such an Embassy if we would The assent of the two would 
naturally draw in that of Germany and other powers would doubtless 
follow." (196) Instead, Britain had been the last major power to 
acknowledge the AIC as legitimate after which the smaller nations had 
followed. 
Although having participated in the emergence of the Congo Free State 
as a viable political entity, the United States had little to do with the 
region—with the exception of participating in the Brussels Anti-Slavery 
Conference of 1890—for the rest of the century. (197) Most likely this 
was largely due to the fierce opposition that confronted those Americans 
involved in the participation the Berlin Conference before and after its 
conclusion. The same sectors of American society that had demanded the 
recognition of the AIC, castigated the participation in the Conference, 
and repudiated Frelinghuysen, Sanford and Kasson for their involvement. 
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While the Conference convened, opposition to the American presence 
grew in both Congress and American newspapers. On January 11, 1684 the 
New York Times had cheered the New York Chamber of Commerce for its 
resolutions calling on the U.S. government to help secure neutrality in 
the Congo by cooperating with the AIA. Exactly one year later, to the 
day, the same newspaper condemned the American presence at the 
Conference. Scathingly referring to Sanford and Kasson as "two 
irresponsible individuals," the editorial stated that "it is certain that, 
with a continuance of our commercial policy, the opening of Africa to 
trade would be of less interest to us than to any fifth rate power in 
Europe." Moreover, such participation "may entail very serious national 
responsibilities." (198) Even the New York Herald turned against the U.S. 
participation at the conference. (199) Although the House of 
Representatives had no official powers in ratifying the General Act, the 
House Foreign Relations Committee submitted two resolutions disapproving 
the American participation in the Conference. Congressman Perry Belmont 
introduced a resolution stating that 
"The House of Representatives...hereby explicitly declares its 
dissent from the act of the President of the United States in 
accepting the invitation of Germany and France to participate 
in the International Conference of Berlin." (200) 
The president-elect, Grover Cleveland, agreed. (201) 
The backlash against American participation in the Berlin Conference 
became part of the the general "repudiation of Arthur and Frelinghuysen" 
in 1885, in response to the administration's expansionist measures. (202) 
One historian couples the signing of the General Act with the Nicaragua 
Canal treaty and the Carribean Reciprocity System as examples of 
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expansionist impulses that would emerge in full bloom in the 1890's. (203) 
Kasson's biographer emphasizes the participation in the Conference as 
""the most serious deviation of our traditional policy since Monroe," a 
part of "the deeper current of American thinking which would become the 
main current within fifteen years." (204) Sanford believed that the Act 
could have won approval had Frelinghuysen pushed it through the Senate 
before the change in administrations. By March, however, it was too late 
and the United States became the only participating power never to ratify 
the General Act of the Berlin Vest Africa Conference. 
XJI. 
The King, "authorized by the Belgian Legislative Chambers to become 
the chief of the new State," informed President Cleveland, in August, 1885, 
that the possessions of the AIC "will hereafter form the Independent 
State of the Congo." The new "Sovereign of the Independent State of the 
Congo" asked Cleveland to "facilitate my task by giving a favorable 
reception to the present notification." In other words, the King had 
renamed the AIC and Leopold wanted the United States to officially 
recognize his new state. (205) 
It is at this point that one finds the most paradoxical aspect in 
this episode. The United States, while not signing the General Act of the 
Conference, did not have reservations about recognizing the Free State as 
it,"does not rest upon the conventional arrangements contemplated by the 
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conlerence of Berlin." (206) The U.S. had been reassured that the King, 
"conforming to article 10 of the general act" of the Conference was in 
fact sovereign over an independent neutral state without ties to any 
European nations. (207) It was this neutrality and independence that the 
U.S. condoned and thus happily recognized the new state. (208) However, it 
was this very independence, the fact that Leopold needed to answer to no 
authority but his own in regard to the Congo Free State, that allowed for 
the widespread attrocities that would later be committed in the new 
state. 
Thus, when on September 11,1885, Cleveland enthusiastically responded 
to Leopold's request by informing him of the U.S. recognition the 
Independent State of the Congo, the United States solidified its role in 
the creation of the worst example of European colonialism. This was far 
from what Cleveland expected when he offered his hearty congratulations 
to the Belgian King as the sovereign of the new State. (209) 
The U.S. had refused to sign the General Act of the Conference, but in 
terms of the American recognition of first, the AIC and subsequently the 
"Independent State of the Congo," the United States had made a decisive 
step away from its isolationist stance and decidedly influenced a part of 
the world many thousands of miles from America's sphere of influence. 
American activities as related to Africa remain a sign that "the outward 
thrust from the United States was becoming too powerful to be restrained 
by a tradition of isolationism that even then was beginning to loose its 
vitality." (210) 
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In terms of the celebrated economic potential of the Congo basin, 
Sanford was the one American, following the Conference, to seriously 
attempt the exploitation of the Congo's resources. <211) In September, 
after the recognition of the AIC, the United States had appointed a 
consul, V.P, Tisdel to travel to the Congo and study its economic 
possibilities. <212> The tone of the resulting correspondence during 
Tisdel's travels are fascinating. Tisdel's early letters to Sanford are 
enthusiastic and positive. By 1885 however, his letters are incessantly 
negative, filled with the numbers of dead and dying that he witnessed. "I 
am dumbfounded with the condition of things out here," he wrote. <213) 
His final report to the State Department detailed little promise for 
American trade. Other reports were just as dismal. (.214) Trade between 
the United States and the Free State remained "almost nonexistent for the 
remainder of the century<215) While in 1865, a whole network of 
consuls and commercial agents guarded American trade interests along the 
western coast of Africa, by the early 1890's, one British survey reported 
not one American ship among the thousand that were cited during a 
certain period. <216) 
In addition, Leopold was eliminating his non-Belgian aids such as 
Stanley and the atmosphere appeared ominous. Stanley wrote Sanford, "I 
hear the Comite Cas Stanley continued to term the State] is still weeding 
out the English at fearful expense, literally buying them out, and I have 
been told that they are only waiting an opportunity to get rid of me 
also." In another letter he warned Sanford that, after visiting the 
King, "I found at Brussels...the same enormous voracity to swallow a 
million square miles with a gullet" and appealed to Sanford to be 
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wary. (217) Sanford, however, had little interest or time for such 
pessimism. 
Epilogue 
Listen to the yell of Leopold's jrhost 
Burning in Hell for his hand—maimed host, 
Hear how the demons chuckle and yell 
Cutting his hands off, down in Hell 
(Vachel Lindsay,Tie Congo) 
Sanford had expended a huge amount of time and energy working for 
Leopold. In the meantime, his financial investments had returned 
increasingly dismal results. Where he had once been a wealthy man, he 
was now heavily indebted to the point that he was forced to sell 
furniture and paintings from his chateau. (1) However, the Conge basin 
provided a great deal of hope. In August 1884, Sanford wrote his wife, 
"If I can get a good hold there it will fix me with regard to the future. 
There is just the sort of work I would like, with both reputation and 
money to gain and the satisfaction of doing good. I think I will have it 
out with H.M...and propose a plan of operations and offer my services." (2) 
He had expected "important things" from his involvement with Leopold and 
in March 1885 suggested to the new proprietor of Central Africa that he 
set up a five-member committee, with Leopold at the helm. Sanford 
suggested that one of these members "should be a practical man capable of 
managing...financial and political interest under the direction of the 
King.... Such a trust I would be willing myself to accept." (3) 
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However, the King, at this point, was dropping all pretense of an 
international enterprise from his plans. After assuming complete control 
of the area in July,1885, Leopold installed favorite Belgians in the top 
administrative positions. Thus, Sanford's high hopes of obtaining a 
government position in the Free State were dashed. (4) 
Leopold did, however, in recognition of Sanford's efforts, grant him 
permission to start a commercial company in the Upper Congo. Sanford 
had mulled over the idea of starting a company at least since 1878.(5) 
Stanley warned Sanford that "under these new conditions [the King's new 
attitude toward non-Belgians] I should seriously advise you to think well 
before you commit yourself. The King's intent ion...to grant you facilities 
means little." (6) However, Sanford, always the speculator, seized the 
opportunity and began rounding up investors for this last chance to 
salvage his lost fortune. (7) With the regional abundance of natural 
resources, particularly ivory, and the native love of considerably cheaper 
items in trade, Sanford felt assured of making a fortune. (8; 
As Stanley had warned, the King's assurances of helping the Sanford 
Exploring Expedition, guarantees upon which Sanford based much of his 
optimism, were soon revealed as empty promises. Although Leopold had 
promised to provide four hundred native porters—a crucial element where 
there was no railroad or highway yet—they were never delivered. 
Moreover, although the Congo State did not eliminate most private 
companies until the 1890's, Sanford's expedition experienced the first 
stages of this trend.(9) 
Sanford, always aware of appearances, had organized the expedition in 
1886 ostensibly for the dual purposes of scientific study and commercial 
116 
trading. Thus he could appear philanthropic and make money at the same 
time. He became concerned however that his leader of the expedition, 
Emory Taunt, would forego the money making goals for the scientific 
goals. Taunt assured Sanford when he wrote in 1886, "give yourself no 
uneasiness about the scientific part of the expedition. I came out here 
soley and entirely to make the money— You can rest easy that I am just 
as anxious to get the ivory, to make the money as any stock holder in 
the company. (10) 
However, like most of Sanford's speculative endeavors, the Sanford 
Exploring Expedition ultimately failed. The Compagnie pour le Commerce 
at l'Industriedu Congo absorbed Sanford's company in 1888.(11) While 
Sanford retained a small share in the company, on his death in 1891 he 
left behind debts and mortgages totalling more than 3150,000.00. His 
wife sold the remaining shares to help pay his creditors. (12) For Henry 
Shelton Sanford, the Congo affair was over. 
Unfortunately, for the people of the Congo basin, the horrors were 
just beginning. By the 1890's, Leopold had complete control over all 
commerce. This "international" state, supposedly created to ensure free 
trade, gradually became nothing more than a personal monopoly. (13) 
Although the state continued to maintain that trade remained unimpeded, 
one contemporary remarked that there was one law of commerce in the Free 
State with two articles: "Article 1: Trade is entirely Free. Article 2: 
There is nothing to buy or sell." (14) 
Why had the United States along with the European nations allowed 
this personal monopoly to emerge? One historian emphasizes that the 
powers were well aware that the "international" AIC was none other than 
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Leopold's organization. "They were so little interested in the 
Association per se that they did not even seek to investigate the nature 
of the body whose sovereignty they were about to recognize." (15) 
But all the powers--the United States, Germany, England and France— 
little cared whether or not Leopold's motives were honest. They realized, 
or thought they did, that by recognizing the Congo Free State, they could 
have all the benefits of controlling a region—particularly freedom of 
trade--without the burdens of political control. In the words of 
Voltaire's Professor Pangloss, the situation appeared to be the "best of 
all possible worlds." Morgan said as much in his report on the 
Congo.(16) 
Thus, the powers overlooked the obvious questions. "Whenever the 
word 'Association' was used in the treaties of 1884-1885, everyone read 
Leopold" and didn't care. (17) 
When the powers agreed in 1885 that all 'vacant lands' in the 
designated area would become the property of the Free State, little did 
they know that on this clause, Leopold would build "a system of state 
monopoly to the exclusion of private enterprise," upon which "the 
enormous machine of exploitation by force" would be built. (18) 
The state proceeded to seize all of the land that held the most 
lucrative products, ivory and rubber. From this point, any trader who 
bought ivory or rubber from the Africans could be accused of receiving 
stolen goods, "stolen, in effect, from the state." (19) 
The atrocities committed in the Congo Free State from the 1880's 
until 1909 make unbearable reading. (20) British Consul Roger Casement 
noted that between 1887 and 1903 the village group Tshumbiri diminished 
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in population from four to five thousand to five hundred. (21) He 
witnessed the same scale of depopulation in many places. It was the 
forced labor of the natives that provided the spectacular profits that 
the Free State initially reaped from its rubber trade. The punishments 
were brutal for both those who complied and those who did not. <.22) 
Continual flaggings, severing of body parts, particularly hands, and 
murder were commonplace. (23) It was Roger Casement's Congo Report of 
1904 that greatly facilitated Belgium's final annexation of the Free State 
in 1908.(24) One who read the report wrote, "I verily believe I saw 
those hunted women...the blood...the hippopotamus hide whip...savage 
soldiery.. .burning villages...the ghastly tally of severed hands."(25) In 
response to the report and other outcries, Leopold commissioned a 
committee to study the Free State and thus justify his position. Instead, 
they indicted his state and the King was forced to relenquish his hold in 
1908. With that act came the birth of the Belgian Congo. When Leopold 
died a year later Mark Twain suggested a memorial for the king—forty 
avenues of skeletons leading to a pyramid of 15,000,000 skulls. (26) 
Largely due to Henry Shelton Sanford's efforts, the United States has 
a place in present day Zaire's tragic history. It is ironic that a major 
move away from traditional isolationism, when the United States set a 
foreign policy precedent by assuming the initiative and recognizing the 
future Congo Free State, placed the U.S. in the worst episode in Western 
imperialism. 
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